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Protections for Software under U.S. and Japanese 
Law: A Comparative Analysis 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The dramatic increase in computer use has created a corresponding growth in 
competition among computer manufacturers.! Accompanying that rivalry is an 
expanding need for better and more thorough forms of protection for computer 
software.2 Three major powers,Japan, the United States, and Western Europe, have 
1. The total number of companies, domestic and foreign, now competing for a share of that market 
in what could be called the digital information industry (i.e., computers, data communications, and data 
services) probably exceeds 1,500. Pushing Harder to Keep Growth on Target, ELECTRONICS, Jan. 13, 1983, 
125, 133 [hereinafter cited as World Markets Report 1983). ELECTRONICS further estimates the dollar value of 
data processing systems, peripherals, and office equipment sold in the United States in 1983 at $63.353 
billion, in Western Europe at $22.185 billion, and in Japan at $14.683 billion. A Glowing Year Foreseen as 
Strong Growth Resumes, ELECTRONICS, Jan. 12, 1984, 123, 126, 142, 148 [hereinafter cited as World 
Markets Report 1984). These dollar amounts are up from 1982 figures of $53.347 billion (U.S.); $19.283 
billion (Western Europe); and $12.102 billion Oapan).ld. ELECTRONICS predicts 1984 figures to increase to 
$79 billion (U.S.); $25.558 billion (Western Europe); and $17.326 billion Oapan). Id. See also Final 
Report of the National Commission on New Technological Use of Copyrighted Works 25-26 
Ouly 31, 1978), reprinted in CoPYRIGHT L. REp. (CCH) Extra Edition, No.2, Aug. 31, 1978 [hereinafter 
cited as CONTU Report); Japan Electronic Firms like Matsushita, Sony Push Into Computers, Wall St. j., 
March 8, 1983, at 1, col. 6 [hereinafter cited as Japan Firms Push Into Computers). 
2. Takaishi,Legal Protection of Software under Japanese Law, 5 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 131, 131 (1982); 
see also International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization, Model Provisions on the 
Protection of Computer Software, reprinted in 11 LAW & COMPUTER TECH. 2, 3-4 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 
Model Provisions). 
ELECTRONICS magazine put the value of the 1982 U.S. software market at $5,001 million and the 1983 
market at $10,309 million. Its predicts the 1984 market to be worth $15,017 million. World Markets 
Report 1984, supra note 1, at 128. 
A computer system configuration consists of hardware and software. Hardware is defined as the 
physical equipment used in data processing. Software, on the other hand, includes the programs, 
procedures, rules and documentation associated with data processing. INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MA-
CHINES CORP. VOCABULARY FOR DATA PROCESSING, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, OFFICE SYSTEMS 184, 190, 
390 (1981). 
Software development entails four steps. The first is the creation of a flow chart as a graphic 
representation of the fundamental idea or algorithm. The second is the development of the source 
program or code as an alphanumeric translation of the flow chart into a computer language such as 
Fortran, Cobol or Algol. The third step is the construction of an assembly program, a further 
translation of the flow chart into a computer-useable program. The fourth step is the development of an 
object program or code (often called microcode or microprogram) as the final translation of the flow 
chart into machine language. Pope, Protection of Proprietary Interests in Computer Software, 30 ALA. L. REv. 
527, 530 (1979). Source code may thus be considered a human-understandable form of software, 
whereas object code is a machine-understandable form of software. 
Object code may be embodied in a variety of forms, including floppy disks or read-only memories 
(ROMs). Floppy disks are flexible records onto which computer programs or data may be written or 
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emerged as the leaders in the world marketplace for data processing equipment.3 
Given this situation, the problems associated with protecting computer software have 
become international in scope. 
Despite the international compass of the problem, few international solutions exist 
or have been proposed for the protection of software. Among those in existence 
today are the Universal Copyright Convention4-and the Berne Convention.s Both of 
these treaties rely, in large part, on a host country's national protections for software, 
rather than an international scheme of protection.6 The World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO)7 has proposed a series of provisions which would secure 
international treatment for software protection.s As of 1980, however, an interna-
tional treaty based on these proposals was four to five years away from submission to 
a diplomatic conference.9 
Because of the lack of international protection for software, national protections 
under individual countries' laws become increasingly important for those wishing to 
safeguard their software. As the sharpest competition in the data processing mar-
from which they may be read an infinite number of times. Computer programs are not permanently 
stored on floppy disks. ROMs, however, are hardware-like memory units in which instructions or data 
are permanently stored for use by the computer. ROMs are available in a variety of integrated-circuit 
configurations including PROMs (programmable read-only memories), EPROMs (electrically pro-
grammable read-only memories), EEROMs (electrically erasable read-only memories) and EEPROMs 
(electrically erasable programmable read-only memories). If the object code software is thus perma-
nently fixed in a ROM, it is often referred to as firmware. Firmware may therefore be defined as 
software in a hardware form. 
There are three classifications of software. Applications software constitutes the bulk of all software 
and determines how raw data will be handled by the computer by establishing whether tbe computer 
will be used as an adding machine or logic system. Compiler software enables computers to translate 
flow chart concepts into machine language and thus determines how the computer will interpret a 
language such as Fortran. Operations software provides computers with the ability to simultaneously 
process multiple sets of data and allows hardware resources to be allocated among several concurrently 
running applications programs. Pope, supra at 531. 
3. See supra dollar figures in note 1. 
4. Universal Copyright Convention, 25 U.S.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. No. 7868. See infra § IV.B. 
5. Berne Convention for the Protections of Literary and Artistic Works, as revised at Paris, July 24, 
1971, U.N. Reg. No. 18,338 (not yet published), as reprinted in CoPYRIGHT L. REp. (CCH) ~~ 11,400.79 
(1978). See infra § IV.A. 
6. For the U.C.C.,see irifra notes 449-53 and accompanying text; for Berne,see infra notes 425-32 and 
accompanying text. 
7. WIPO was established in 1970 to centralize the task of the administration of industrial property 
and copyright on an international level. It is comprised of a general assembly of representatives of 
member states, a permanent secretariat designated as the International Bureau for Intellectual Prop-
erty, and a coordinating committee with consultative and executive function. WI po. operates the 
international registration of trademark, deposit of designs. and registration of the appellations of 
origin, as well as the recording of international patent applications. H. DEGENHARDT. TREATIES AND 
ALLIANCES OF THE WORLD 38 (3d ed. 1981). 
8. See Model Pr(fVisions, supra note 2. at 11-27. 
9. Braubach. Computer Software International Protection, 2 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 225. 228 (1980). 
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ketplace is between the United States and Japan,1O each country's laws warrant 
close scrutiny. 
Both the United States and Japan hold technological leadership positions with 
respect to the design and production of data processing equipment. I I Each competes 
with the other at homel2 and abroad. 13 Neither country has established a fully 
developed set of legal guidelines for software.14 Taken together, these facts place 
software developers in a precarious position in a highly competitive market with 
regard to their investment in software. 
The actual dollar amounts involved in U.S. and Japanese production of data 
processing equipment serve to underscore the importance each country has in the 
world marketplace. Together, the United States and Japan prodced over $78 
billion in data processing equipment in 1983.15 Import and export data further 
demonstrate the significant role Japan and the United States play in each other's 
domestic computer market. In 1981, Japan held a 23.4% share of all data processing 
equipment and parts imported by the United States.16 These imports had a value of 
$386 million, a 103.4% increase over 1980 imports of$189.8 millionY By contrast, 
the United States held a 46% share of the Japanese computer market in 198J.lB This 
share represented $235.5 million in shipments of computers and parts to Japan, a 
0.3% drop from 1980 shipments of $242.4 million.19 The need to know each 
country's legal safeguards for computer technology becomes increasingly significant 
as japan's and the United States' technological economies become more closely 
entwined. 
Japan does not have the domestic expertise to develop software in the same 
10. Straining to Lift Consumption after a Slow Start, ELECTRONICS, jan. 13, 1982, 121, 145 [hereinafter 
cited as World Markets Report 1982). See U.S.-japan Competition in Small Computers, 47 JAPAN ECON. INsT. 
REp., Dec. 18, 1982 [hereinafter cited as Small Computer Competition); U.S.-japan Competition in Mainframe 
Computers, 29A JAPAN ECON. INNT. REP., july 30, 1982 [hereinafter cited as Mainframe Competition). See 
also japan Firms Pwh Into Computers, supra note I. 
II. See World Markets Report 1984, supra note I. 
12. World Markets Report 1982, supra note 10, at 146; see also U.S. Imports from japan, by Commodity, 
1981, 34A JAPAN ECON. INST. REp., Sept. 3, 1982 [hereinafter cited as U.S. Imports from japan, by 
Commodity, 1981). 
13. See West Germany Computer Firms Fighting to Take Turf from Foreign Companies, Wall St. J., April 27, 
1983, at 38, col. 3; see also World Markets Report 1982, supra note 10, at 138. 
14. Takaishi,supra note 2, at 131; see also Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer, 545 F. Supp. 812, 
819 n.IO (E.D. Pa. 1982), for some observations on the conflicts in the area of software protection. 
15. See World Markets Report 1984, supra note I. 
16. U.S. Importsfromjapan, by Commodity, 1981, supra note 12, at 5. All of japan's major computer 
manufacturers compete in the U.S. marketplace. These manufacturers include Fujitsu, Hitachi, Nippon 
Electric, Toshiba, Mitsubishi, and Oki Electric. See generally Small Computer Competition, supra note 10; 
Mainframe Competition, supra note 10. 
17. U.S. Imports from japan, by Commodity, 1981, supra note 12, at 5. 
18. Okamatsu,japantse Computer Indwtry and Government Policy, 21 J. OF JAPANESE TRADE&: INDUS. 22, 
25 (1982). Leading importers were U.S.-based computer makers International Business Machines 
Corporation, Sperry Univac, Burroughs Corporation, and NCR Corporation. Id. 
19. U.S. E~ to japan, by Commodity, 1981, 24A JAPAN EcON. INST., REp. june 25, 1982, at 6. 
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profusion as it is being developed in the United States.20 However, the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry in Japan underwrites software development 
through government-initiated projects.21 Until they gain the same level of expertise 
in software development as U.S. companies have, the Japanese will look to software 
developments taking place in the United States as a basis for their own software 
projects. 22 This situation illustrates the need for an understanding of the legal 
guidelines applicable to software in each country because of the thin line that exists 
between independent development efforts and the actual copying of software. 
The increasing importance of software in configuring computer systems also 
underscores the need for a working knowledge of both Japanese and U.S. software 
safeguards. By 1985, industry observers expect that software associated with certain 
systems will exceed the cost of the hardware on which it runs. 23 Presently, estimates 
put the cost of software at 70% of the system COSt. 24 Total sales estimates in the 
United States for software range from $13 billion25 to as high as $45 billion.26 
Software developers are seeking ways to protect their investment against 
unauthorized infringement. 27 This Comment explores the established and de-
veloping protections against infringement in the United States and Japan. 
Under U.S. law, such safeguards include patent, copyright, and trade secret 
protections. This Comment analyzes both the historical development of these 
software protections as well as current case law. After considering U.S. law, the 
author turns to the protections available under Japanese law, including Japanese 
copyright and patent laws, as well as protections available under tort law. Finally, 
the author explores those protections currently available under international 
treaties or proposed under multinational agreements. 
20. See Yoshio, Technological Transfer: Grafted or Potted, 7 JAPAN ECHO 25 (1980). Yoshio contends that 
most programming languages such as COBOL do not readily lend themselves to translation into 
japanese, and therefore, in order to become proficient programmers, japanese software developers 
must first be fluent speakers of English. Id. at 31-34. 
21. Okamatsu, supra note 18, at 28. 
22. Small Computer Competition, supra note 10, at 5. 
23. World Markets Report 1982, supra note 10, at 129. 
24. Model Pruuisions, supra note 2, at 3. 
25. Id. 
26. World Markets Report 1983, supra note I, at 133. 
27. See, e.g., Warner Says Top Atan Official Leaving, Wall SI. j., Dec. 9, 1982, at 7, col. 1, for recent 
attempts by video game maker Atari to protect its software by patent and copyright suits; see also IBM 
Wins Tough Trade Secrets Ruling, Wall St. j., Dec. 1, 1982, at 7, col. 1, for coverage of recent IBM case 
seeking injunction against former employees revealing secrets about IBM's personal computer. 
Infringement can be the actual copying of a software program by another without permission, or it 
can be the misappropriation of trade secrets by a competitor or an employee. In essence, infringement 
is the use of a patent, copyright or trade secret without authorization. 
U.S. federal patent law defines infringement as the making, selling or using of any patented 
invention without authority. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1982). U.S. copyright law defines infringement as the 
violation of any exclusive rights of the copyright owner. 17 U .S.C. § 501 (1982). The Restatement of 
Torts imposes liability on anyone who employs methods falling below the generally accepted standards 
of commercial morality and reasonable conduct in obtainin'g another's trade secrets. RESTATEMENT OF 
TORTS §§ 757, 759 (1939). 
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II. PROTECTIONS UNDER U.S. LAW 
Protections afforded software under U.S. law have been uncertain because of 
the haphazard safeguards they offered,28 the inconsistent interpretations of the 
law applied by the courts,29 and the difficulty in enforcement. 30 Most software 
developers have relied on trade secret law coupled with licensing agreements31 
to protect their investment in software development.32 However, trade secret 
protection becomes less effective as the software is more widely distributed over 
a greater number of users. 33 Other developers have turned to federal patent and 
copyright protections,34 but, until recently, these safeguards have failed to meet 
the needs of the industry. 
With current developments in both patent and copyright protection, however, 
software developers may now look to these federal statutory safeguards with 
increasing assurance. In 1981, the Supreme Court handed down its landmark 
decision of Diamond v. Diehr,35 marking a turning point in the patentability of 
software.36 A brief examination of the state of the law prior to Diehr will serve to 
put this important case into context. 
A. Patent Protection Prior to 1981 
The U.S. Constitution grants to Congress the broad powers to "promote the 
progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors 
and inventors the exclusive rights to their respective writings and discoveries."37 
Central to the Patent Act of 1952 is section 101, which provides that "whoever 
invents or discovers any new or useful process, machine, manufacture or com-
position of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a 
28. See, e.g., Synercom Technology Inc. v. University Computing Company, 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. 
Tex. 1978), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 111-16. In Synercom, the court found that the 
plaintiff had protected its data processing manuals by copyright, but that its software formats were not 
covered by copyright. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1013-14. 
29. Compare Williams Electronics v. Artic International, 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982) and Apple 
Computer v. Franklin Computer, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) with Apple Computer v. Franklin 
Computer, 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 154-73. 
30. See Model Provisions, supra note 2, at 4. The International Bureau of WIPO notes that effective 
protection and enforceability is needed because of the vulnerability of computer software to copying 
once a prototype is made. Id. 
31. Bender, Trade Secret Software Protection, § 4-4 COMPUTER L. SERVICE art. 2, 5-7 (1977). 
32. Braubach, supra note 9, at 225. Up to seventy-eight percent of software firms depend on trade 
secret law coupled with license contracts to protect software. Id. 
33. Maggs, Computer Programs as the Object of Intellectual Property in the United States of America, 30 AM. J. 
COMPo L. 251, 252 (1982 Supp.). 
34. Braubach, supra note 9, at 225. About 15-17% of software firms protect computer software by 
copyright, and about 5% by patent. Id. 
35. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
36. See infra text accompanying notes 60-69. 
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 8. 
38. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). 
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patent therefore."38 After qualifying as statutory subject matter, an invention 
must be found noveP9 and non obvious to one skilled in the art. 40 Under the 
patent laws,41 inventors receive an exclusive license for a specified time period as 
an incentive for invention and research.42 In exchange for this exclusive license, 
patent holders must fully disclose the details of their inventions in their patent 
applications. 43 Upon the expiration of the seventeen-year exclusivity period, 
anyone may use the patented knowledge without the need to obtain a license 
from the patent holder.44 
Prior to 1981,45 two Supreme Court rulings precluded patent protection for 
software. First, in the 1972 case of Gottschalk v. Benson, 46 the Court found that a 
mathematical formula or algorithm used to change decimal numerals into binary 
numerals47 was in essence an idea, which is not patentable.48 If the Court had 
granted a patent, the free use of the algorithm for changing decimal numbers 
into binary numbers would not have been permitted to anyone in the data processing 
industry other than the patent holder. 49 The Benson Court further noted that in 
a process claim,50 the transformation and reduction of an item to a different 
state or thing is the key to the patentability of that claim when the process does 
not rely on a specific machine.51 Thus, for a general process involving a software 
39. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). See, e.g., In Re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1972). 
40. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982). See, e.g., Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976). 
41. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1982). 
42. Rose, Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in Computers and Computer Programs: Recent D/!Velop-
ment, 9 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 547, 549 (1982). 
43. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1982). 
44. Kewanee Oil v. Bicron, 416 U.S. 470, 480-81 (1974). 
45. For a discussion of other patent claims in earlier cases, see Pope, supra note 2, at 536-42; see also 
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 193-205 (1981) (Stevens, j., dissenting). 
46. 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
47. The Benson Court gave the following description of the encoding process: 
The BCD system using decimal numerals replaces the character for each component decimal 
digit in the decimal numeral with the corresponding four'digit binary numeral .... Thus 
decimal 53 is represented as 0101 00 II in BCD, because decimal 5 is equal to binary 0101 and 
decimal 3 is equivalent to binary 00 II. In pure binary notation, however, decimal 53 equals 
binary 110 101 .... The method sought to be patented varies the ordinary arithmetic steps a 
human would use by changing the order of the steps, changing the symbolism for writing the 
multiplier used in some steps, and by taking subtotals after each successive operation. The 
mathematical procedures can be carried out in existing computers long in use, no new 
machinery being necessary. 
Benson, 409 U.S. at 66-67. 
48. Id. at 71-72. "An idea of itself is not patentable." Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 
Wall) 498, 507 (1874). 
49. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72. 
50. "A process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or 
series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state of 
thing." Cochran v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 788 (1876). The other type of patent claim, a machine or 
apparatus claim, is derived from 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). 
51. Benson, 409 U.S. at 70. 
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program that could run on any computer, the process must change one item into 
a totally different one.52 
Second, in Parker v. Flook,53 decided in 1978, the Court again denied a patent 
application because the only novel feature of the process sought to be patented 
was a software program used to calculate a mathematical formula. 54 In Flook, the 
respondent sought to patent a method whereby the danger limits used in moni-
toring catalytic conversion processes were updated using a computer program. 55 
The Flook Court distinguished those claims in which a patent is sought on a 
process using a mathematical formula from those claims in which the process is 
actually the mathematical formula.56 The Court noted that no matter how 
limited the application of a process based solely on a mathematical formula, the 
process would not constitute statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 10I.57 At 
the conclusion of both the Benson 58 and Flook5 9 opinions, the Court emphasized 
the need for congressional action in the area of software protection, underscor-
ing its unwillingness to provide judicially enacted protection. 
B. Patent Protection ajter 1981 
Congress did not act on the Court's recommendations in either Benson or 
Flook. In 1981, the Court once again considered a patent application for a 
process using a computer program. In Diamond v. Diehr,60 the Court upheld the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals decision that a claim based on subject 
matter that otherwise meets statutory criteria does not become unpatentable 
simply because a computer is involved.6! The Court found that the respondents' 
claims were not based solely on a mathematical algorithm or an improved 
method of calculation, such as those in Benson and Flook, but rather were based 
on a recitation of an improved process for molding rubber.62 
The key to the Court's decision lay in the fact that a computer and its 
associated software were part of an overall process used to transform raw rubber 
into molded rubber.63 Thus, the algorithm met the test laid out in Benson in that 
52. See, e.g., discussion infra of rubber·molding process in Diamond v. Diehr at text accompanying 
notes 60-65. 
53. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
54. [d. at 594-95. 
55. [d. at 585. 
56. [d. at 590. 
57. [d. 
58. Benson, 409 U.S. at 72-73. 
59. Flook, 437 U.S. at 595-96. 
60.450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
61. [d. at 181. 
62. [d. 
63. Id. at 184-85. 
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it was part of a process used to transform and reduce an article to a different 
state or thing.64 The Court concluded that the Benson algorithm had as its sole 
practical application the programming of a general purpose digital computer, 
whereas the Diehr algorithm had a practical application beyond the mere pro-
gramming of a computer. 65 
An equally divided Court acknowledged a similar claim in a companion case to 
Diehr. 66 In re Bradley 67 dealt with a claim based on a computer program stored in 
firmware. 68 The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held that the invention 
was statutory despite Benson and Flook, because the claim involved an invention 
which combined a number of tangible hardware elements, including some ele-
ments which happened to contain microprogrammed information, or firm-
ware.69 The claim was a machine claim based on these elements rather than a 
process claim based on software as in Diehr. 
Despite the Supreme Court's holding in Diehr, individual software programs 
will probably remain unpatentable because of the Court's reasoning that the 
software must be an integral part of a process or machine. 70 Even if the software 
program satisfies the statutory subject matter requirement,11 it still must meet 
both the nonobviousness 72 and novelty73 requirements. 74 As few as one percent 
of all programs may be inventive enough to meet these requirements and qualify 
for patent protection. 75 
Software developers will most likely not choose to seek patent protection for 
the large number of programs developed each year because of the delay and 
expense involved. 76 One such time-consuming difficulty facing a software devel-
oper in obtaining a patent is the two to five year backlog of applications at the 
Patent Office. 77 Such a backlog may preclude the developer from obtaining a 
patent before the software becomes obsolete. Another is the expense of obtain-
ing a patent, which includes the cost of finding a qualified examiner, conducting 
an investigation of the novelty and inventiveness of the program, and establish-
64. Id. at 181. 
65. Id. at 187. 
66. Diamond v. Bradley, 450 U.S. 381 (1981). 
67. 600 F.2d 807 (1979). 
68. Id. at 812. For a discussion of firmware, see supra note 2. 
69. In re Bradley, 600 F.2d at 813. 
70. Maggs, supra note 33, at 253-54. 
71. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
72. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
73. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
74. Maggs, supra note 33, at 254; see also Note, Copyright Protection for Firmware: An International View, 4 
HASTINGS INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 473,480 (1981). 
75. Model Provisions, supra note 2, at 5. 
76. CaNTU Report, supra note 1, at 41-42. 
77. Oxman, Intellectual Property Protection and Integrated Circuit Masks, 980 ]URIMETRICS J. 405, 434 
(1980). 
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ing the documentation on the prior art. 78 This cost often falls between $2,500 
and $5,000 for each patent application. 79 
Unrestricted disclosure to the public presents one of the most serious draw-
backs to seeking a patent. 80 Software developers are loathe to make the full 
disclosure necessary for a patent application because the widespread distribution 
of computer programs makes detection of infringement difficult. The patent 
application becomes a public record, and anyone may duplicate it without a 
license with little chance of being caught. 81 
Because of the difficulty in obtaining patent protection for most software 
programs, and the delays and expense associated with those patents which are 
obtained, patent safeguards do not have widespread appeal among software 
developers. However, many software developers are turning to another federal 
statutory protection - copyright - as a means of safeguarding their investment. 
Today, as with patent claims, copyright claims are being upheld in cases where, 
until just a short time ago, such claims were found to be ungrounded. A brief 
summary of the copyright law, both past and present, as it applies to software will 
serve to put this increasingly popular protection into perspective. 
C. Copyright Protection 
A second statutory protection for software is federal copyright law. 82 As with 
the patent laws, the copyright laws are promulgated under Congress' constitu-
tional power. 83 A copyright protects the expression of an idea, but not the 
underlying idea itself.84 A copyright holder is entitled to a numbM.of rights, 
including those of reproduction, preparation of derivative works, distribution, 
performance, and display.85 Unlike a patent, a copyright does not depend on 
any governmental action; it automatically obtains through authorship.86 Copy-
/d. 
78. Model Provisions, supra note 2, at 5. 
79. Note, supra note 74, at 481 n.50. 
80. Model Provisions, supra note 2, at 5. 
8!. Id. 
82. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982). 
83. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
84. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982) states: 
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of author-
ship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which 
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid 
of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories: (I) literary 
works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including 
any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and 
sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and (7) sound recordings. 
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any 
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery regard-
less of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. 
85. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). 
86. Keplinger, Copyright and Information Technology, 15 ANN. REv. INFORMATION SCI. & TECH. 3, 5 
(1980). 
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right protection for software has been evolving rapidly over the past decade 
through legislative changes and through judicial interpretation of those evolving 
copyright laws. 
Congress amended the Copyright Act in 1976.87 The amendment, effective 
January I, 1978,88 made several significant changes. 89 The first involved the 
principle of automatic copyright.90 This change significantly altered previous 
copyright laws under which federal copyrights came into existence only after 
publication. 91 Prior to publication, the common law principles of copyright in the 
various states prevailed. 92 Under the new Copyright Act, however, the federal 
law preempts all state laws that provide equivalent protection.93 Thus, a single 
federal system now applies to all published and unpublished works as soon as 
they are fixed in a tangible medium of expression. 94 
87. Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101,90 Stat. 2541 (1976). 
88. Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 102,90 Stat. 2541, 2598 (1976). 
89. See Keplinger, supra note 86, at 4-9. 
90. H.R. REp. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, 147 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 5664 [hereinafter cited as House Report on Copyright Law]. "Under the general scheme of the 
[law], statutory copyright protection is secured automatically when a work is created, and is not lost 
when the work is published." /d. 
The principle of automatic copyright has also been defined as one whereby a copyright in a work 
attaches on the creation and fixation of that work in some tangible medium of expression without the 
need to publish, register, or abide by any formalities. Keplinger, supra note 86, at 4. 
/d. 
[d. 
[d. 
91. House Report on Copyright Law, supra note 90, at 129. 
Instead of a dual system of "common law copyright" for unpublished works and statutory 
copyright for published works ... the [law] adopts a single system of Federal statutory 
copyright from creation .... Common law copyright protection for works coming within the 
scope of the statute would be abrogated, and the concept of publication would lose its 
all-embracing importance .. 
92. Id. at 131. 
[S]ection 301(b) explicitly preserves common law copyright protection for one important 
class of works: works that have not been "fixed in any tangible medium of expression." ... 
[U]nfixed works are not included in the specfied "subject matter of copyright." They are 
therefore not affected by the preemption ... and would continue to be subject to protection 
under State statute or common law until fixed in tangible form. 
93. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). 
94. House Report on Copyright Law, supra note 90, at 129. 
By substituting a single Federal system for the present anachronistic, uncertain, impractical, 
and highly complicated dual system, the [law] would greatly improve the operation of the 
copyright law and would be much more effective in carrying out the basic constitutional aims 
of uniformity and the promotion of writing and scholarship. 
The House Report listed four arguments in favor of a federal system. The first noted that the 
copyright clause of the Constitution was enacted to promote uniformity. The second emphasized that 
although the concept of "publication" was the single most important idea under the then current law, it 
also posed the most serious defect. The third argument underscored the need for a limited time during 
which the copyright would be effective. This need is constitutionally mandated, and under the state 
common law system, was sorely abused because a work could remain unpublished for any number of 
years without this time being counted toward the federal copyright time limitation. The fourth 
argument stated that a uniform copyright system would improve international dealings with copy-
righted material. [d. at 129-30. 
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A second change effectively eliminated the judicially interpreted requirement 
that a work had to exist in a human-readable form to be eligible for copyright.95 
A work which is within the scope of the copyright law96 is protected regardless of 
its form, be it videotape, computer tape, magnetic disk, hologram, phonograph 
record, or any medium sufficiently stable to permit its repeated reproduction. 97 
The third major change in the copyright law relaxes the notice requirement. 98 
Notice consists of three elements: the word "copyright" or equivalent symbol, the 
year of the first publication of the work, and the name of the copyright owner.99 
Previously, minor flaws in the notice had caused outright forfeiture of the 
copyright.loo The current requirements apply only to works that are publicly 
distributed and may be met within a five-year date of publication. lol 
Although these three changes have implications for the software industry, 
none of the changes in the 1976 Act directly affected software protection. 
Congress expressly enacted section 117 to maintain the then current status of the 
copyright law with respect to computer programsl02 until it could further evalu-
95. [d. at 52-53. This change finally set aside the holding in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. 
Apollo Co., 209 U.S. I (1908). In White-Smith, the Supreme Court held that a player piano roll was not an 
infringing copy of the musical composition recorded on it. The Court reasoned that the music 
embodied on the roll was not a written or printed record intelligible to humans, and thus not 
copyrightable. [d. at 17. 
The House noted that the broad language of § 102(a) was intended "to avoid the artificial and largely 
unjustifiable distinctions derived from [cases] such as White-Smith ... under which statutory copy-
rightability in certain cases has been made to depend upon the form or medium in which the work is 
fixed." House Report on Copyright Law, supra note 90, at 52. 
96. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982). See supra note 84 for text of § 102(a). 
97. Keplinger, supra note 86, at 4-5. 
Under the [law] it makes no difference what the form, manner or medium of fixation may 
be - whether it is in words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures, or any other graphic or symbolic 
indicia, whether embodied in a physical object in written, printed photographic, sculptural. 
punched, magnetic, or any other stable form, and whether it is capable of perception directly 
or by means of any machine or device "now known or later developed." 
House Report on Copyright Law, supra note 90, at 52. 
98. 17 U .S.C. §§ 40 I, 405. 406 (1982). 
99. 17 U.S.C. § 401(b)(I), (2), (3) (1982). 
100. House Report on Copyright Law, supra note 90. at 143. 
[d. 
[T]he copyright notice has real values which should be preserved, and ... this should be done 
by inducing use of notice without causing outright forfeiture for errors or omissions. Subject to 
certain safeguards for innocent infringers, protection would not be lost by the complete 
omission of copyright notice from large numbers of copies or from a whole edition, if 
registration for the work is made before or within 5 years after publication. Errors in the name 
or date in the notice could be corrected without forfeiture of copyright. 
[d. 
101. 17 U.S.C. § 405(a)(2) (1982). 
102. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1976) stated: 
[T]his title does not afford to the owner of copyright in a work any greater or lesser rights 
with respect to the use of the work in conjunction with automatic systems capable of storing, 
processing, retrieving. or transferring information. or in conjunction with any similar device, 
machine, or process, than those afforded to works under the law. whether title 17 or the 
common law or statutes of a State. in effect on December 31, 1977, as held applicable and 
construed by a court in an action brought under this title. 
364 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. VII, No.2 
ate the effect of copyright protection.for software. In December 1980, Congress 
passed the Computer Software Copyright Actl03 to provide coverage for com-
puter programs not provided under the 1976 enactment. l04 The Act closely 
follows the final recommendations of the National Commission on New Techno-
logical Use(s) of Copyrighted Works (CONTU).105 The Commission had re-
commended reenactment of section 117 and incorporation of a definition for 
computer programs within section 101.106 The Act contains two provisions: an 
amendment to section 101 to incorporate the definition of a computer pro-
gram l07 and an amendment to section 117 to define permissible uses of copy-
righted works in conjunction with a computer. lOS The House of Representativ~s 
has also considered one further amendment to Title 17.109 This amendment 
would expand and add definitions to the Copyright Act to clarify the type of 
software entitled to copyright protection,uo 
103. Pub. L. No. 96-517 § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028-29 (1980). 
104. See H.R. REp. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 6460, 6482-83. For a history of the amendment, se. Rose, supra note 42, at 558-62; Note, 
supra note 74, at 487-92. 
105. CONTU Report, supra note I, at 29-34. For a history of the Commission, see Keplinger, supra 
note 86, at 9-13. 
106. CONTU Report, supra note 1, at 29-30. 
107. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). "A 'computer program' is a set of statements or instructions to be used 
directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." Id. 
Id. 
108. 17 U .S.C. § 117 (1982) now states: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for t1te owner of a 
copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of 
that computer program provided: 
(1) that such a new copy or adapation is created as an essential step in t1te utilization of the 
computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other manner, or 
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all archival copies 
are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the computer program should cease to 
be rightful. Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this section may be 
leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from which such copies were 
prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other transfer of all rights in the program. 
Adaptations so prepared may be transferred only with the authorization of the copyright 
owner. 
109. H.R. 6983, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). H.R. 6983 was introduced in August 1982 by Con-
gressman Robert Kastenmeier, but was defeated in subcommittee later in the year. Representative 
Kastenmeier planned to reintroduce the bill during the 1983 session. Telephone conversation with 
congressional aide (Feb. 16, 1983). 
110. H.R. 6983 provided for three major changes in the copyright laws for the protection of 
software. The first was that even if a notice of copyright appeared on a program or program material, 
this would not constitute publication under §§ 401 through 406, and consequently not endanger the 
software developer's trade secret protections. 
The second change redefined computer program in § 101 as follows: 
A 'computer program' means a set of instructions capable, when incorporated in a machine-
readable medium, of causing a machine having information processing capabilities to indicate, 
perform or achieve a particular function, task or result. 
A 'program description' means a complete procedural representation in verbal, schematic, 
or other form, in sufficient detail to determine a set of instructions constituting a correspond-
ing computer program. 
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An examination of the case law decided under the pre-1980 amendment to 
the copyright law provides an understanding of the judicial evolution of copy-
right protection. Furthermore, an exploration of how the pre-1980 amendment 
courts dealt with the copyrightability of software as a generic work of authorship 
helps to provide some comprehension of how courts are now dealing with 
software in its myriad forms, such as object and source code. 
1. Case Law under the 1976 Copyright Act 
In 1978, a federal district court in Texas decided one of the leading cases for 
computer program protection under the original Copyright Act. In Synercom 
Technology Inc. v. University Computer Company, 11 I the plaintiff Synercom brought 
suit for copyright infringement of its instruction manuals and input formats 
used with a computer program designed to solve structural engineering prob-
lems. Synercom's formats used nine types of inputs, the logic and sequence 
arrangement of which were Synercom's own design. 112 Synercom claimed that 
the defendant, University Computing Company (U.C.C.), through its managing 
consultant, Engineering Dynamics Inc. (E.D.l.), had developed a computer 
program with input formats identical to those used with Synercom's program. 
Thus, U.C.C. could woo away Synercom's clients with little or no interruption in 
service to the clients and with no major development costs. The court's holding 
turned on whether E.D.I. had appropriated only the idea behind the input 
formats (no infringement) or the expression of the formats (infringement). The 
court found that the input formats were expressed ideas, not expressions, and 
hence not copyrightableY3 The court distinguished an expression as a stylistic 
creation exceeding the bare expression of sequence and arrangement associated 
with simple ideasy4 The court found that Synercom's input formats were ideas 
'Supporting material' means any material, other than a computer program or a program 
description, created for aiding the understanding or application of a computer program, for 
example, problem descriptions and use instructions. 
'Computer software' means any or several of the literary works referred to in the definitions 
of computer program, program description and supporting material. 
H.R. 6983, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). 
This second change closely parallels suggestions made by the Model Provisions set forth by the World 
Intellectual Property Organization. See infra text accompanying notes 465-68. 
The third change would be in the preemption provision, section 301. The amendment language 
states: U[nlothing in this title shall alter or limit any right or remedy which the owner of a copyright may 
have under State trade secret law that is not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights with the general 
scope of copyright as specified by section 106." H.R. 6983, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). 
This third alteration would solve those potential conflicts now posed between state trade secret 
protections and federal copyright protections. See, e.g., Technicon Medical Information Systems v. 
Orein Buy Packaging, PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) (E.D. Wisc. 1981). 
111. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978). 
112. /d. at 1007. 
113. [d. at 1013-14. 
114. /d. at 1014. 
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based solely on order and sequence and that this arrangement was inseparable 
from the underlying idea. 115 The court also found, however, that Synercom's 
manuals were copyrightable and that Synercom was entitled to relief for in-
fringement of the copyright applicable to themP6 
In a 1980 case decided by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Data Cash 
Systems Inc. v.JS&A Group Inc., 117 the plaintiff, a manufacturer of computer chess 
games, attempted to prevent the defendent from using plaintiff's computer 
program in a competing product. The program which ran the chess game was 
contained in a ROM (read-only memory) module." s The defendant had ob-
tained a copy of the game, read the computer program from the ROM, and 
duplicated it. 11 9 The plaintiff had printed copyright notices on all of its manuals, 
but had failed to print any notice on the ROM itself. The court held that the 
program was not copyrighted and that the defendant therefore was not infring-
ing. 12O More importantly, the district court had found that the plaintiff's ROM 
was not a copy under the copyright law, and thus defendant's reproduction of 
the ROM was not an infringement.121 The parties did not appeal this issue, and 
the Seventh Circuit did not address it directly. The appeals court considered 
the issue by implication, however, in that it would not have reached the notice 
requirement issue unless it first found the ROM was copyrightable. 
Cases such as Synercom and Data Cash, although decided after the January 1, 
1978, effective date of the Copyright Act of 1976, implemented pre-1976 law. 
This implementation was required under the 1976 version of section 117. These 
cases focused on the fundamental issue of whether software, as a generic work of 
authorship, could be copyrighted under the law. Thus, they provide a basic link 
in the understanding of how copyright protection has become applicable to 
software in the United States. Generally, as the above discussion on Synercom and 
Data Cash illustrates, the courts found that software was not statutory subject 
matter under the copyright law. However, Congress then stepped into the fray 
and as a result, with the enactment of the 1980 amendment, no question now 
exists that computer programs can be statutory subject matter under the copy-
right laws.122 
The courts have gradually become more technologically sophisticated and are 
now deciding what kind of software is copyrightable. The following discussion 
chronicles the current debates confronting the courts on such topics as the 
115. /d. 
116. Id. at 1013. 
117. 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980). 
118. For a discussion of ROMs, see supra note 2. 
119. Data Cash, 628 F.2d at 1041. 
120. Id. at 1044. 
121. Id. at 1041. See Note, supra note 74, at 495-96, for discussion of the lower court finding. 
122. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text. 
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protection afforded video games under copyright,123 the protection of object 
code by source code copyright,124 the copyrightability of software embodied in a 
utilitarian form such as a ROM,125 and the safeguarding of software which is in 
the form of firmware. 126 
2. Evolution of Copyright Protection Since 1980 
The courts have decided numerous cases involving computer programs since 
1980. Some courts127 have used the Copyright Act of 1976 as a basis for their 
decisions, believing it to be adequate without subsequent changes, while others128 
have used the version amended in 1980. The decisions fall into two general 
categories: those dealing with software underlying video games and those deal-
ing with software used on general-purpose computers. Although the latter type 
of decision will have a greater effect on the evolution of copyright for software, 
the video game decisions, resting solely on the copyrightability of the displayed 
audiovisual effects of the games, provide an intermediate step in the evolution of 
computer program copyrightability. 
a. Video Games: The Copyrighting of Audiovisual Works 
Although all video games, whether fol' arcade or home use, employ computer 
programs to generate the moving images, sounds, and scores, some recent cases 
fail to emphasize the role of the computer program in video games and rely 
much more on the physical aspects of the games. 129 In all cases, the plaintiff has 
been the developer of a computer-based video game which has been copied or 
"knocked Off"130 by a competing defendant. In such cases, the defendant has not 
only saved development time, but often has also capitalized on the plaintiff's 
marketing efforts and brand name. 131 
While some courts acknowledge that the games are based on computer pro-
grams stored in ROMs,132 most do not. This outcome is largely a result of the 
123. See infra § I.C.2a for a discussion of protections afforded video games. 
124. See, e.g., discussion infra of eCA at text accompanying notes 149-54. 
125. See, e.g., discussion infra of Williams at text accompanying notes 155-62. 
126. See, e.g., discussion infra of Apple at text accompanying notes 163-80. 
127. See, e.g., discussion infra of Taruiy at text accompanying notes 138-48. 
128. See, e.g., discussion infra of Williams at text accompanying notes 155-62. 
129. See, e.g., Stern Electronics v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982); Atari v. North American 
Phillips Consumer Electronics, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 33 (7th Cir. 1982); Atari v. Armenia, Ltd., 1981 
COPYRIGHT L. REp. (CCH) ~ 25,328 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Atari v. Amusement World, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 
929 (D. Md. 1981); Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Artie International, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1152 
(N.D. Ill. 1981); Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981). 
130. See, e.g., Stern Electronics, 669 F.2d at 854-55. 
131. See, e.g., North American, 214 U.S.P.Q. at 33; Midway Manufacturing, 211 U.S.P.Q. at 1152, for 
copyright infringement claims concerning the video game PAC-MAN. 
132. Stern Electronics, 669 F.2d at 854; Amusement World, 215 U.S.P.Q. at 932; Dirkschneider, 543 F. 
Supp. at 481. 
368 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. VII, No.2 
plaintiff couching the infringement claim in terms of an audiovisual work for 
which a copyright has been obtained and video tapes deposited with the Copy-
right Office as representative of the copyrighted work. 133 Instead, the courts 
look to the similarity of the copyrighted work to the infringing work. 134 The 
courts then determine whether the alleged copy is so similar to the plaintiff's 
work that a reasonable person would conclude that the defendant had misap-
propriated the plaintiff's copyrighted materiaJ.135 The courts are not comparing 
computer program with computer program, but rather one audiovisual work 
with another, and as such they have not explored the nature of software copy-
rightability in these recent video game cases. 
b. Software: Present Protections under Copyright Law 
Since the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, and its 1980 amendment, courts 
have wrestled with the application of copyright law to the technical subject 
matter of computer software. Where there is little or no visible evidence of a 
computer program, as with the audiovisual output of the video games discussed 
above, the courts have considered the nature of the computer software to 
determine whether the copyright covers the software claimed to be infringed.136 
The courts have also struggled with the utilitarian nature of computer programs 
as opposed to the creative aspects of developing them. 137 
In Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, 138 the court based its holding on the 
original Copyright Act of 1976, rather than the 1980 amended version of section 
117, stating that ROM copies were adequately protected under sections 101 and 
102 of the 1976 Act.139 In Tandy, a manufacturer of personal computers brought 
an action based on copyright infringement against the defendant, also a man-
ufacturer of personal computers. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had 
copied an input-output routine that told a computer how to take the information 
put into it by an operator in one language and translate that information into a 
simpler machine language. 14o A ROM contained the program in question. The 
defendant alleged that the ROM could not be copyrighted under the pre-1980 
amendment law, claiming that the original section 117 froze all law pertaining to 
copyright protection of software in its pre-1976 form. Under this interpretation, 
the defendant claimed that ROMs were not copyrightable because they were not 
133. Stem Electronics, 669 F.2d at 854; Amusement World, 215 U.S.P.Q. at 932; Artic, 211 U.S.P.Q. at 
1158; Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. at 475. 
134. Compare Atari v. Armenia, 1981 COPYRIGHT L. REp. (Centipedes and War of Bugs video games) 
with Atari v. Amusement World, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 929 (Asteroids and Meteors video games). 
135. Atari v. North American Philips, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 39. 
136. See, e.g., Williams discussed infra at text accompanying notes 155-62. 
137. See, e.g., the Apple district court decision discussed infra at text accompany notes 163-74. 
138. 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1980). 
139. Id. at 174. 
140. Id. at 173. 
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III human-readable form.14l The court found otherwise, holding that sections 
101 142 and 102143 of the 1976 Copyright Act were applicable and that computer 
programs are works of authorship under section 101.144 The court further held 
that a program fixed in a ROM was protected as "a tangible medium of expres-
sion" under section 102145 and thus not subject to the outmoded human-
readable requirement. 146 As an alternative basis for its decision, the court agreed 
with the plaintiff that in order to duplicate the program the defendant would 
have had to copy a visual display or printed version of the program and imprint 
it on a chip,147 thus violating a right traditionally granted under the copyright 
laws: that of reproducing the copyrighted work in copies. 14M 
In eCA v. Chance, 149 the plaintiff manufactured, sold, and repaired machines 
which processed silicon wafers used in the production of integrated circuits. The 
defendants were former employees of the plaintiff and had gone into business 
for themselves repairing plaintiff's machines. GCA held copyrights on the 
source code150 of certain computer programs used in a diagnostic and operating 
systems series. The object code 151 of the programs was not copyrighted. The 
defendants claimed that ti1e object code was not a protected work, relying on the 
definition of "publication" in section 101. 152 The defendants argued that the 
copyrighting of the source code - which plaintiff had not distributed, and thus 
had not published - did not protect the underlying object code, which plaintiff 
had distributed, and therefore published. 153 The court, however, held that the 
141. [d. at 174. 
142. 17 U.S.C § 101 (1982). Section 101 defines various terms used in Title 17. It defines "fixed" in a 
"tangible medium of expression" as: "an embodiment ... sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to 
be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration." 
Section 10 1 defines "literary works" as "works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in words, 
numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material 
objects ... in which they are embodied." [d. The Tandy court seemingly relied on these definitions in 
concluding that section 101 was applicable to a finding that computer programs were works of 
authorship. Tandy, 524 F. Supp. at 173. 
143. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). For the text of § 102, see supra note 84. 
144. Tandy, 524 F. Supp. at 173. For a discussion on the nature of copyright making it applicable to 
the expression of a com puter programmer in creating software programs, see House Report on 
Copyright Law, supra note 90, at 57. 
145. Tandy, 524 F. Supp. at 173. 
146. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
147. Tandy, 524 F. Supp. at 175. 
148. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (I) (1982). 
149. 1982 COPYRIGHT L. REp. (CCH) If 25,464 (N.D. Cal. 1982). 
150. See supra note 2. 
151. See supra note 2. 
152. 17 U .S.C. § 10 1 (1982) defines "publication" as: "the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a 
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. The offering to 
distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public 
performance, or public display, constitutes publication." [d. 
153. eCA, 1982 COPYRIGHT L. REp. at If 25,464. 
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object code, as a derivation of the source code, was the same as the source code, 
and thus copyrighted.154 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Williams Electronics v. Artie Interna-
tionaP55 ignored previously made arguments on the copyrightability of the 
audiovisual effects of computer programs and found that the defendant directly 
infringed plaintiff's computer program copyright. The plaintiff had obtained 
both a copyright on the audiovisual effects and a copyright on the computer 
program underlying its video game. 156 The plaintiff had placed readily visible 
copyright notices on the game's cabinet, screen, and each label affixed to the 
internal ROM modules.157 
The defendant argued that plaintiff's copyright was an improper attempt to 
copyright the ROMs themselves, which could be protected as utilitarian objects 
under the patent laws. 15s The Court of Appeals found, however, that the 
plaintiff was trying to protect its artistic expression in an original work. The 
plaintiff had met the statutory fixation requirement of section 102(a) by embody-
ing the computer program in ROM modules. lS9 The defendant further errone-
ously argued that there was no infringement because, although the source code 
was copyrightable, the object code was not because it was not in human-readable 
form.160 The Third Circuit looked to a broad interpretation of section l02(a),161 
and a similar holding in Tandy that object code is the same as source code for 
copyrightability, to find that the defendant had infringed plaintiff's copyright of 
a computer program. 162 
In contrast, the district court in Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer, 163 ruling 
several days before the Third Circuit handed down the Williams decision, held 
that a computer program in the form of object code is not statutory material for 
copyright protection under the copyright laws. The plaintiff, Apple Computer, 
is an acknowledged leader in the manufacture of personal computers.164 
Franklin Computer makes personal computers that are compatible with Apple's 
computer.165 Apple claimed that Franklin had infringed a series of copyrights on 
the object code programs stored in ROM as firmware or on floppy disks.166 
154. ld. 
155. 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982). 
156. Id. at 875. 
157. Id. at 872. 
158.ld. at 876; see also supra note 84 for text of 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982). 
159. Williams, 685 F.2d at 874. 
160. Id. at 876-77. 
161. For the text of 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982), see supra note 84. 
162. Williams, 685 F.2d at 877. 
163. 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
164. Id. at 812. 
165. Id. at 814. By having an Apple-compatible computer, Franklin is able to take advantage of 
software programs designed exclusively for the widely-used Apple computer. 
166. Id. at 815. 
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These programs were integral to Apple's operating system and, as such, pro-
vided Franklin with an immediate compatibility with all Apple-based software 
and hardware. 167 
The district court found that the confusion surrounding the source code as an 
original work of authorship 168 as it translated into object code made it difficult, if 
not impossible, to determine that the object code was copyrightable subject 
matter. 169 The court reasoned that programmers do not envision the actual 
series of microswitches manipulated by object code, but rather communicate 
their ideas in expressions found in the source code. 170 The court found that the 
source code, as representative of an expression, is copyrightable. 171 The court 
went on to find that object code, for the most part, is utilitarian in nature and 
able to be protected by patents, and thus not copyrightable. 1 72 The court stressed 
that the appropriate protection for object code, if it could be had, would be a 
patent, such as that obtained in In re Bradley. 173 The court conceded, however, 
that few computer programs would be able to pass the rigorous patent tests.l74 
Nearly a year later, the Third Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Williams in an 
appeal from the district court's Apple decision}75 The appeals court reiterated 
that software embedded in a ROM is copyrightable. 176 The Third Circuit also 
emphasized that the operating system Apple sought to protect by copyright was 
copyrightable! 77 despite Franklin's claims that the operating software, as distinct 
from applications software, was uncopyrightable because it was utilitarian! 78 
The court also grappled with Franklin's argument that an operating system was 
not copyrightable because it was an idea, rather than an expression. 179 The court 
found that so long as programs can be written that perform the same function as 
an existing operating system, they will be an expression of an idea and hence 
copyrightable .180 
The law in the area of software copyrightability remains unsettled to date. 
Courts continue to evaluate the newly revised copyright laws with conflicting 
167. Id. at 814-15. 
168. The Apple court had no quarrel with the copyrightability of source code. Id. at 822 n.15. 
169. Id. at 820-21. 
170. /d. at 821-22 n.14. The Apple court quotes at length from T. KIDDER, THE SoUL OF A NEW 
MACHINE 97-102 (1981) about the detailed engineering work involved in actually writing object or 
microcode. Apple, 545 F. Supp. at 821-22 n.14. 
171. Id. at 821-22. 
172. Id. at 823-24. 
173. Id. at 824; see also the discussion infra on software patentability in § II.A. 
174. Apple, 545 F. Supp. at 824. 
175. Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer, 714 F.2d 1240, 1248-49 (3d Cir. 1983). 
176. Id. at 1249. 
177.Id. at 1253-54. 
178. Id. at 1250-51. 
179. Id. at 1253. 
180. Id. 
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outcomes.181 The district court's Apple decision reflects this confusion. In some 
jurisdictions the object code, as a derivative of source code, retains the copyright 
originally applied to the source code. Such was the result in eCA. The same may 
be said of software in the form of firmware. This may be safeguarded by 
copyright in some instances such as Tandy, and not in others. Software embodied 
in ROMs may run the risk of being classified as utilitarian, rather than creative, 
and thus not copyrightable. This confusion is not healthy for the burgeoning 
software industry. Insecurity with respect to legal safeguards will lead to in-
creased costs and litigation as software developers attempt to define and enforce 
their rights. 182 
There is no doubt that copyright provides a form of protection, but courts 
must determine the extent of that protection as well as which forms of software 
may be safeguarded by copyright. Until the courts settle this matter with some 
assurance, software developers will continue to turn to tested methods of insur-
ing their investment. Foremost among these safeguards is trade secret protec-
tion. 
D. Trade Secret Protection 
Until the Supreme Court decision in Diamond v. Diehr183 and the recent 
copyright law changes, the most popular form of protection for software was 
trade secret protection enforceable under state law.184 Unlike the situation with 
either patent or copyright protection, the owner-developer of software can 
maintain trade secret protection without disclosure. As Chief Justice Burger 
noted in Kewanee Oil v. Bicron: 185 
the subject of a trade secret must be secret, and must not be of public 
knowledge or of a general knowledge in the trade or business .... 
This necessary element of secrecy is not lost, however, if the holder 
of the trade secret reveals the trade secret to another in confidence, 
and under an implied obligation not to use or disclose it. 186 
Consequently, many of the dealings between software vendors and vendees have 
181. Other recent cases include: Apple Computer v. Formula International, COPYRIGHT. L. REp. 
(CCH) ~ 25,631 (9th Cir. 1984); S&:H Computer Systems v. SAS Institute, 568 F. Supp. 416 (M.D. Tenn. 
1983); Hubco Data Products v. Management Assistance, CoPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) ~ 25,529 (D. Idaho 
1983); BPI Systems v. Leith, 1982 CoPYRIGHT L. REp. ~ 25,392 (W.O. Tex. 1982); Warrington Associates 
v. Kellog Citizens National Bank, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 375 (E.D. Wise. 1981). 
182. Rather than continue the legal battle to the Supreme Court, Franklin settled with Apple for $2.5 
million. Wall St. j., Jan. 5, 1984, at 10, col. 1. 
183. See supra text accompanying n~tes 60-65. 
184. Scafetta, Computer Software and Unfair Methods of Competition, 10 J. MAR. J. PRAc. 8< PROC. 447, 
449-50 (1977). 
185. 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
186. Id. at 475. 
1984] PROTECTIONS FOR SOFTWARE 373 
been in the form of licensing agreements whereby the licensee has an obligation 
not to disclose the software developer's trade secrets to third parties. 1M7 
A trade secret is defined as: 
any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is 
used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain 
an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be 
a formula for a chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, 
treating or preserving materials, a pattern for a machine or other 
device, or a list of customers. 1MM 
Software, so long as it is not widely distributed or easily accessible to people 
outside the company, can be protected by trade secret laws. 1M9 
Trade secret law can safeguard computer programs in three ways. First, a 
software owner may design the program so that it will run only on the software 
owner's computer. 190 Second, the developer may sell or lease the program to a 
limited number of users, each of whom must sign a formal trade secret protec-
tion agreement. 191 This second method is the preferred means of distribution 
for large com puter manufacturers selling to large corporations or institutions. 192 
Third, the developer may sell the program to the public at large without requir-
ing that a trade secret agreement be signed. For this method to work reliably, the 
program must be in an undecipherable or uncopyable form.193 This last method, 
however, is becoming less reliable for mass-marketed programs. 194 
Unlike patents and copyrights which grant an exclusive license for a limited 
period of time, trade secrets are open to discovery by any fair and honest means, 
such as independent invention, accidental disclosure, or reverse engineering. 195 
1. The Case Law 
The courts have not hesitated to apply trade secret law to the misappropria-
tion of computer programs. 196 The theft of trade secrets in the form of software 
187. Maggs, supra note 33, at 252. 
188. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939). 
189. Scafetta, supra note 184, at 450. 
190. Maggs, Some Problems of Legal Protection of Programs for Microcomputer Control Systems, 1979 V. 111. 
L.F. 453, 465. Maggs cites as an example of such a program one which analyzes geological data and 
predicts the location of oil reserves. [d. Normally such a program would be run only within the confines 
of a highly secure installation belonging to the program owner. [d. 
191. [d. 
192. [d. 
193. [d. 
194. See Data Cash Systems v.JS&A Group, 628 F.2d 1038, 1043 (7th Cir. 1980), discussed supra at 
text accompanying notes 117-121. In Data Cash, plaintiff relied on the supposed impregnability and 
indecipherability of its ROM, only to have the competition copy it. 
195. Kewanee Oil, 416 V.S. at 476. Reverse engineering is taking a known product and working 
backward to discover the process which aided in its development or manufacture. 
196. See generally Bender, supra note 31. See also discussions infra on Com-Share v. Computer Complex at 
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can occur through the abuse of a licensee!97 the breach of contract by an 
employee!98 or the breakdown of a joint venture with another company.199 In 
most instances a competitor has solicited, or will eventually acquire, the informa-
tion. 
The 1971 case of Com-Share v. Computer Complex 20o illustrates the abuse that can 
occur through a licensee. Com-Share had signed a technical exchange agree-
ment with the defendant whereby information, systems software developments, 
training, documents, tapes, tangible items, and other technology developed by 
the plaintiff were to be exchanged with the defendant for similar information 
and technical items.201 The agreement called for a twenty-four month 
moratorium on any information disseminated to any third party after the parties 
terminated the agreement. 202 The parties ended the agreement, and within a 
twenty-four month period the defendant sold its rights, assets, and goodwill 
relating to its computer time-sharing operations to a third party, Tymshare. 203 
The court found that the plaintiff had used the utmost caution in protecting the 
secrecy of its software through such means as the words "company confidential" 
printed on all pages of all computer listings, passwords designed into the 
software to prevent unauthorized use, and the securing of magnetic tapes and 
symbolics when not in use.204 The court granted a preliminary injunction against 
the defendant selling its interest to Tymshare. The Sixth Circuit upheld this 
ruling.205 
In University Computing v. Lykes Youngstown,206 the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals found that the defendant had breached a joint venture agreement by 
misappropriating trade secrets. The court found that the defendant had misap-
propriated plaintiff's software for automated inventory management evaluation 
by receiving stolen property from one of plaintiff's customers. 207 The court 
assessed damages against the defendants as if they had been properly licensed to 
use the software. 208 
One of the more significant cases for trade secret misappropriation of com-
text accompanying notes 200-05, and University Computing v. Lykes Youngstoum at text accompanying 
notes 206-08. 
197. See, e.g., Com-Share v. Computer Complex discussion infra at text accompanying notes 200-05. 
198. See, e.g., Republic Systems & Programming v. Computer Assistance, 440 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 
1971). 
199. See, e.g., University Computing v. Lykes Youngstoum, discussed infra at text accompanying notes 
206-08. 
200. 338 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D. Mich. 1971). 
201. /d. at 123l. 
202. [d. at 1232. 
203. [d. 
204. [d. at 1234. 
205. Com-Share v. Computer Complex, 348 F.2d 1341 (6th Cir. 1972). 
206. 504 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1974). 
207. [d. at 533-34. 
208. [d. at 545. 
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puter technology is Telex v. International Business Machines. 209 Telex had brought 
an action against IBM based on the Sherman Act for antitrust violations. IBM 
counterclaimed, bringing an unfair competition action based on misappropria-
tion of trade secrets. The district court and the court of appeals found that Telex 
had misappropriated IBM trade secrets by hiring away IBM employees for 
greatly increased salaries, substantial bonuses, and stock options in order to 
develop peripheral devices, such as memory units and printers, in a shorter span 
of time than if Telex had had to go through the entire development process 
itself. 210 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's finding that Telex had 
taken the source code for a program used in the diagnosis, checkout, and 
debugging of various devices used in one of IBM's computer systems.211 The 
court of appeals found damages for IBM in the amount of $17,500,000, plus 
$1,000,000 in punitive damages.212 
These three cases illustrate the varied forms trade secret protection can take in 
application to software programs. Com-Share demonstrates the need to have strict 
enforcement procedures in place for monitoring individual licensees. These 
procedures can include agreements with nondisclosure clauses and tight security 
at the licensor's premises. University Computing takes these precautions a step 
further in mandating extreme caution and protective measures when dealing in 
ajoint venture situation. Finally, Telex serves as a landmark decision for would-
be takers of competitors' employees. Telex stands for the proposition that trade 
secret theft is not just the stealing of documents and equipment, but also the 
misappropriation of company knowledge contained in employees' minds. Fur-
thermore, with its $18.5 million damages award, Telex points to the expense of 
trade secret theft. 
In the past, as the above discussion demonstrates, trade secret law afforded an 
effective means of protection for software developments. Trade secrecy will 
remain an important means of protection for large systems software developers 
in the future. 213 As newer markets open up for mass-marketed computer sys-
tems, however, software developers will seek other methods of protection.214 
Protecting a product through trade secret law is costly: a software developer 
must curtail wide distribution of the product, closely watch employees, maintain 
special storage areas, and give close attention to details such as stamping 
confidential documents.215 As software vendors develop programs for ever 
209. 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975). 
210. Id. at 911, 929. 
211. Id. at 911. 
212. Id. at 933. 
213. Scafetta, supra note 184, at 449-50; see also CONTU Report, supra note I, at 84-85 (Commis-
sioner Hersey's dissent). 
214. Maggs, supra note 33, at 252; see also CONTU Report, supra note I, at 38. 
215. See generally Scafetta, supra note 184. 
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widening markets, trade secrecy will become increasingly difficult and expensive 
to maintain between the seller and the buyer. Policing trade secret agreements to 
ensure that the many buyers are adhering to the provisions will also become 
more difficult.216 Other problems remain with respect to traditional trade secret 
protection as well. Preemption is one such problem. 
2. Preemption of Trade Secret Law by Federal Law 
Trade secret law is based on state common law.217 As such, federal supremacy 
with regard to the patent and copyright laws is an issue.218 Section 301 of the 
Copyright Act of 1976219 preempts state law with regard to any works that are 
within the scope of protection afforded by the federal copyright laws. 22o How-
ever, the courts had largely settled the preemption issue before the passage of 
section 301 in 1976.221 
a. Pre-1976 
Prior to 1976, the courts found little conflict between state trade secret laws 
and federal copyright laws because the federal laws were only applicable after 
publication or public distribution.222 This was demonstrated in Goldstein v. Cali-
fornia,223 where the Supreme Court determined that the copyright clause of the 
Constitution224 and the federal statute enacted under that clause225 were not in 
conflict with California's own copyright statutes226 as applied to pirated musical 
recordings.227 The Court found that the federal copyright laws were intended to 
protect compositions of original musical work,228 not renderings of an original 
performance,229 and therefore the states were free to legislate in the latter 
area.230 
The Supreme Court relied on Goldstein in the later case of Kewanee Oil v. 
Bicron,231 in deciding another conflict between state trade secret law and federal 
216. See Maggs, supra note 33,'at 252. 
217. Bender,supra note 31, at 2. 
218. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck 8< Co. v. Stiffe1 Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964). 
219. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (19768< Supp. V 1981). 
220. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. 
221. See discussion infra on Goldstein at text accompanying notes 223-30 and Kewanee Oil at text 
accompanying notes 231-38. 
222. 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1947). See, e.g., Loew's v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 18 Cal. 2d 419, 
115 P.2d 983 (1941). 
223. 412 U.S. 546 (1973). 
224. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 8. 
225. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1976). 
226. CAL. PENAL CODE § 653h (West 1970). 
227. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 571. 
228. [d. at 565. 
229. [d. at 566. 
230. [d. at 566, 570. 
231. 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
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patent law. In Kewanee Oil, the petitioner sought the protection of Ohio's trade 
secret laws in an action claiming that former employees had misappropriated 
trade secrets pertaining to the manufacture of synthetic crystals used in the 
detection of ionizing radiation. 232 The court of appeals reversed the lower 
court's finding that trade secret law was applicable. The court of appeals ruled 
that Ohio's trade secret law was in conflict with federal patent law and that the 
manufacture of synthetic crystals was a more appropriate subject for federal 
patent law. 233 The court reasoned that Ohio had no power to grant monopoly 
protection under its trade secret laws in an area covered by federallaw. 234 The 
Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, basing its holding in large part on 
the arguments presented in Goldstein. 235 The Court differentiated between trade 
secret laws and the patent laws, observing that both provide different incentives 
for business. 236 The Court reasoned that the abolition of trade secret protection 
would not result in increased public disclosure of discoveries that were not 
covered by patent protection. 237 Furthermore, the Court noted that the disclo-
sure of customer lists or advertising campaigns would not benefit the public, 
adding that keeping such information secret encourages business to embark on 
new plans of operation for competition, which in turn promotes a wide variety of 
business methods. 23s 
Following Kewanee Oil, a software developer may opt for either patent or trade 
secret protection. 239 Once a program has been disclosed in a patent application, 
however, trade secret protection is no longer available. 240 It follows that trade 
secret protection will remain available for any software not described in the 
patent application. 
b. Post-1976 
Since the enactment of the Copyright Law of 1976, software developers have 
not been able to rely automatically on both trade secret and copyright law for 
protection. 241 As federal copyright law now applies equally to published and 
232. /d. at 473. 
233. Id. at 474. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. at 478-79. "Just as the States may exercise regulatory power over writings so may the States 
regulate with respect to discoveries. States may hold diverse viewpoints in protecting intellectual 
property relating to invention as they do in protecting the intellectual property relating to the subject 
matter of copyright." Id. at 479. 
236. Id. at 483. 
237. Id. 
238. /d. 
239. See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 482-83, for the proposition that patent law and trade secret law are 
mutually exclusive as protections. 
240. CONTU Report, supra note 1, at 47. 
241. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text; see also Maggs, supra note 33, at 272. 
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unpublished works (the latter only so long as no wide distribution occurs without 
notice),242 the use of trade secret protection in conjunction with federal copy-
right protection presents a preemption issue. 
A recent case, Warrington Associates v. Real-Time Engineering Systems, 243 held that 
preemption does not occur because the interests secured by the copyright law 
under section 301(b)244 and the state trade secret law are not equivalent.245 In 
Warrington Associates, the plaintiff, a designer and marketer of computer 
software programs for banks and other financial institutions, filed a claim against 
the defendant for wrongful appropriation of its secret computer software pro-
grams.246 The court found that while the disclosure of the copyrighted expres-
sion does not negate rights protected therein, the same disclosure could strip the 
underlying idea of its protection under trade secret law.247 The court found that 
the two protections interact.248 Once a developer has copyrighted and pub-
lished a program, the chances that it will be subject to unprivileged disclosure 
increase.249 However, the publishing of a work does not necessarily mean that 
the underlying trade secret is disclosed or eliminated.250 The court concluded 
that different legal concepts underlie each type of law. Tort law and the con-
comitant concepts of breach of trust and confidentiality provide the foundation 
for trade secret law. 251 On the other hand, copyright law, while also premised on 
tort law, incorporates the concept of outright copying.252 
The House of Representatives has considered measures which would elimi-
nate any problems of preemption between state trade secret law and federal 
copyright law.253 Under the House proposals, section 301 would be amended so 
that nothing in the copyright laws would alter or limit any right or remedy which 
the owner of a copyright might have under state trade secret law, provided the 
state protected right or remedy is not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights 
within the general scope of copyright as specified by 17 U.S.C. § 106.254 
242. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text. 
243. 522 F. Supp. 367 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
244. 17 U .S.C. § 301 (b) (1982) provides: "Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies 
under the common law or statutes of any State with respect to ... (3) activities violating legal or equitable 
rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as 
specified by sec. 106." 
245. Warrington Associates, 522 F. Supp. at 368. 
246. [d. at 367-68. 
247. [d. at 368. 
248. [d. 
249. [d. 
250. [d. 
251. !d. at 369. 
252. [d. 
253. H.R. 6983, 97th Cong., 2d Sess (1982). See supra note 110 and accompanying text for partial 
text, and discussion, of bill. 
254. See supra text accompanying note 220. 
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c. Summary of the Preemption Problem 
Trade secret law remains a tested method of protection for software. How-
ever, under the new copyright law, which protects works of authorship prior to 
mass publication, a software developer may be forced to choose between federal 
copyright protection and state trade secret protection because of the preemption 
doctrine. This same problem does not occur with patent protection and trade 
secret law, provided the software sought to be protected by trade secret princi-
ples is not disclosed in a patent application. It is doubtful that a court would 
prevent the use of trade secret protection when someone is also seeking copy-
right protection, but the House has nevertheless been considering legislation 
affirming this outcome.255 
E. Conclusions under U.S. Law 
The law in the United States has been changing rapidly within the past few 
years, and evolving protections for software have emerged. Based on the reason-
ing of the Supreme Court in Diamond v. Diehr, so long as the com puter program 
is part of a process, and is not purely a mathematical formula or algorithm, the 
developer may possibly obtain a patent. Copyright protection, however, has 
become the most reliable method of protection since the passage of the Copy-
right Act of 1976 and the 1980 amendment directed at computer programs. 
Courts are struggling with various interpretations of the law insofar as it protects 
object code, but the trend seems to be in favor of protecting all forms of 
software. A software developer may still invoke trade secret protection as a tested 
method of maintaining rights in a software program. There is some indication 
that, although the Copyright Act of 1976 preempts all equivalent state law, it 
does not preempt trade secret law because the latter protects different legal 
rights in software. 
These protections combine to form an assured legal basis for the U.S. software 
developer at home. Given the intense competition from Japanese computer 
makers both in the United States and Japan, however, an understanding of that 
country's legal protections for software developments is necessary. The follow-
ing analysis discusses those Japanese legal protections which most closely parallel 
U.S. legal developments, as well as those safeguards which appear to have little 
similarity to U.S. law. 
III. SOFTWARE PROTECTION UNDER JAPANESE LAW 
Under Japanese law, a developer may protect software using one of several 
methods.256 None of these methods has yet obtained an official imprimatur of 
255. See supra discussion of legislation at note 110. 
256. Takaishi, supra note 2, at 131. 
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either specific legislation or judicial decision as has occurred in the United 
States.257 The two most effective methods for widely distributed software are 
copyright258 and patent protection. 259 Other methods include a tort action 
brought to secure a right,260 an action based on breach of contract of a licensing 
agreement,261 or general criminal sanctions for theft under patent or copyright 
laws. 262 
Compared to U.S. law, Japanese protections for software are inadequate. 
None of the statutory language makes specific mention of computer software, 
and thus much of the law's application to software must be implied. Further-
more, because the Japanese law does not provide for trade secret misappropria-
tion, but only for tort actions to secure tangible rights,263 much of the protection 
afforded developers under U.S. trade secret law is unavailable in Japan. Thus, 
Japanese developers must rely solely on nondisclosure clauses in licensing 
agreements, whereas U.S. manufacturers couple such agreements with trade 
secret protection.264 Of all the Japanese protective measures available for 
software, however, copyright protection in Japan is that which most closely 
parallels U.S. law. 265 
A. japanese Copyright Law 
The Copyright Law266 applies to unfair competition involving copyright in-
fringement. 267 Article 2 of the law defines a copyrightable work as a "production 
in which thoughts or sentiments are expressed in a creative way and which falls 
within the literary, scientific, artistic or musical domain."268 Article 10 lists those 
works for which copyright protection is available. These include literary, musical, 
and artistic works, figurative works of a scientific nature such as plans, charts, 
257. See generally id. 
258. /d. at 132. 
259. /d. at 137. 
260. [d. at 138. 
261. Id. 
262. [d. 
263. See infra § HI.C. 
264. See supra discussion of U.S. trade secret law in § H.D. 
265. The japanese legislature has been considering weakening copyright protection for software 
programs, replacing it by a limited patent protection, and requiring all foreign software developers to 
license their software to domestic japanese producers. Wall St. j., March 16, 1984, at 31, col. 4. It seems 
likely that the discussion will continue into the next legislative session. Wall St. j., March 20, 1984, at 10, 
col. 3. 
266. Law No. 48, 1970, translated in UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL 
ORGANIZATION, COPYRIGHT LAws AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD, JAPAN (1971 & Supp. 1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as COPYRIGHT LAW]. 
267. PINNER'S WORLD UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW (§ Survey) (H. Dawid ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as 
PINNER]. See generally, T. DOl, THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW OF JAPAN (1980) for a discussion of 
the history of copyright law in japan. 
268. COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 266, art. 2(I)i. 
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and models, and cinematographic and photographic works. 269 The law protects 
these works against unauthorized reproduction or copying if they consist of 
sentences, photographs, or pictures of original creation.270 
Copyright protection extends only to the form of the expression, rather than 
the idea, methods, schemes, or systems expressed by letters, numerals, or draw-
ings.271 This concept is embodied in the language of Article 2 which states that 
thoughts must be expressed in a creative manner if they are to be copyright-
able.272 In this respect, Japanese law is similar to the U.S. law which states that 
copyright does not extend to any idea, concept, or principle regardless of the 
form in which it occurs.273 
The rights given to a copyright holder under Japanese law may be split into 
two groups: one comprising exclusive rights274 and the other moral rights. 275 
The first group includes such rights as the right of reproduction,276 the rights of 
translation and adaptation,277 and the right to exploit a derivative work.278 
These rights closely parallel those found under U.S. copyright law. 279 Moral 
rights guaranteed by the Japanese copyright law are more ephemeral and 
include such rights as the right to make a work public,280 the right of an author 
to use, or not use, the author's name on the worP81 and the right of an author to 
preserve the integrity of a work. 282 U.S. law does not recognize these rights, nor 
does it appear that it will at any time in the near future. 283 
1. Japanese Copyright Law as Applied to Software 
For a work of authorship to be copyrightable under Japanese law, it must meet 
the three criteria set out in Article 2 of the Copyright Law.284 First, the work 
must be an expression of an idea or a feeling of the author.285 Second, the work 
must be creative and original in the major portion of its expression. 286 Third, the 
269. /d., art. 10. 
270. PINNER, supra note 267, § I I. 
271. /d. § 33. 
272. See discussion supra at text accompanying note 268. 
273. See supra note 84 for the text of 17 U .S.C. § 102(b). 
274. COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 266, arts. 21-28. 
275. /d., arts. 18-20. 
276. ld., art. 21. 
277. ld., art. 23. 
278. /d., art. 28. 
279. 17 u.s.c. § 106 (1982). 
280. COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 266, art. 18. 
281. ld., art. 19. 
282. /d., art. 20. 
283. See infra notes 440-42 and accompanying text. 
284. See supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
285. ld. 
286. /d. 
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work must be expressed in one of those forms specified under Article 10, such as 
words, characters, colors, pictures or other images, or sound.287 
A computer program is a work which creatively expresses ideas or concepts of 
a programmer regarding a method of performing tasks by a computer. 2MB Most 
programs are creative and original in their expression and are written in com-
puter languages that are similar to prose.2B9 As such, Japanese legal observers 
generally hold computer programs to be copyrightable subject matter under 
Japanese law.290 
The Computer-Related Committee of the Copyright Council published a 
discussion of the limited scope of the application of copyright protection to 
computer programs in 1973.291 The Committee determined that it would not be 
appropriate to revise the copyright law so as to grant the copyright owner of a 
program an exclusive right either to execute the program292 or to distribute it.293 
The Committee found that the right of execution is a right to use or apply the 
program and as such is not covered by copyright provisions on exclusive rights 
of creation or authorship.294 The Committee noted further that the right to 
distribute a computer program would be a powerful and limiting right on the 
time, place, and purpose of disposal of that program. The Committee observed 
that such a policy would be at odds with the spirit of the current copyright laws 
providing for the uninhibited use and enjoyment of a copyrighted work.295 The 
Committee also recommended that the period of protection afforded copy-
287. See supra note 269 and accompanying text. 
288: Takaishi, supra note 2, at 132. 
289.1d. 
290. Id. Takaishi cites four reports which have concluded that software is copyrightable in Japan. 
These reports are: (I) Electric Communication Research Institute, Research on Software (Feb. 1972); 
(2) Research Committee on Legal Protection of Software, Interim Report on Legal Pl'Otection of 
Software (May 1972) (pl'Oduced by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry) [hereinafter cited 
as the MITI Report); (3) Cultural Affairs Agency, (Computer-Related) Report of the Copyright 
Council (the second committee report,June 1973) [hereinafter cited as the Copyright Council Report] 
and (4) Special Committee on Research for Legal Pl'Otection of Software, Interim Report on Research 
for Legal Pl'Otection of Software (March 1981) (produced by the Japanese Software Industry Associa-
tion). Takaishi, supra note 2, at 131 n.3. 
The MITI Report is summarized in 6 COMPUTER L. SERVo (CALLAGHAN), § 9-4, art. 3 (1973); the 
Copyright Council Report is summarized in Nomura, Letter from Japan, 10 COPYRIGHT 129, 133 (1974). 
291. PINNER, supra note 267, § 33; Stt also the Copyright Council Report, supra at note 290. 
292. Nomura,supra note 290, at 134. The Committee found that the execution ofa program when it 
is copied into main memory is not the same as reproducing the program because the action is so 
transient, and therefore not a proper subject for copyright. Id. 
293. Id. 
294. Id. at 134. For a discussion of these exclusive rights, see supra text accompanying notes 76-78. 
295. Nomura,supra note 290, at 134. Article I of the Copyright Law specifies that the purposes of the 
provisions are to secure the rights of authors and to justly and fairly exploit the cultural products of 
authorship, thereby contributing to the development of the country's culture. COPYRIGHT LAW, supra 
note 266, art. I. Therefore, limitation on the distribution of a copyrighted work would not aid in the 
development of Japanese culture because it could limit access to copyrighted works. 
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righted works should be shortened.296 The current term of protection is for fifty 
years after the death of the author. 297 
A 1972 report by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) 
echoed these conclusions.29s The MITI Report stated that computer programs 
could be regarded as literary works falling within the scope of science since most 
of them are creations involving technical ideas.299 The Report also concluded 
that computer programs would not be sufficiently protected under the Copy-
right Law because it was not applicable to the execution of programs.300 The 
Report observed that duplicated efforts in software creation were unavoidable so 
long as no registration or publication system existed in Japan.30 ! Finally, the 
Report concluded that the term of protection was too long.302 
2. The Types of Software Protected under Japanese Copyright Law 
There is little doubt that program materials such as designs, flow charts, and 
manuals are copyrightable.303 The former two materials are regarded as "artistic 
works" and the latter as a "literary work."304 However, an object program written 
in machine-readable language cannot be a copyrightable original since it is a 
mere copy of the source program.305 Such programs obtained by changing the 
program language lack originality and therefore constitute reproductions. 306 
Using this reasoning, any program which is a permutation of the source pro-
gram is no more than the reproduction of the source program.307 
There is growing sentiment in Japan, however, that object code may be 
copyrightable subject matter.30S The Interim Report of the Japanese Software 
Industry Association309 made three points in favor of copyrighting object code. 
296.Id. 
297. COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 266, art. 51(2). 
298. See supra note 290. See also 6 COMPUTER L. SERV. (CALLAGHAN), supra note 290, at 3. 
MITI occupies a prominent position in japan's industrial policy making process. Almost all of japan's 
major industries come within its purview. Among its primary responsibilities are the management of 
specific technical areas such as patents used by small businesses, and industrial technology, the control 
of raw materials and energy used by industry, the supervision of industrial development including the 
monitoring of production and distribution chains, the regulation of foreign trade and commercial 
policies, and the determination of overall industrial structures. Note, Regulating Japanese Automobile 
Imports: Some Implications of the Voluntary Quota System, 5 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 431, 454 (1982). 
299. 6 COMPUTER L. SERVo (CALLAGHAN), supra note 290, at 3. 
300. Id. Compare with note 292 and accompanying text, supra. 
301. 6 COMPUTER L. SERVo (CALLAGHAN), supra note 290, at 3. 
302. /d. Compare with text accompanying notes 295-97, supra. 
303. Takaishi, supra note 2, at 132. 
304.Id. 
305. Id. 
306. Nomura, supra note 290, at 133. 
307. Id. 
308. Takaishi, supra note 2, at 132. 
309. See supra note 290. 
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The first is the necessity of providing legal and economic protection for object 
code31o when under prevailing industry practice the user obtains a copy of the 
computer program in this form. 3ll The second is that the requirement of 
creativity or originality312 does not have to be interpreted strictly. Therefore, 
object code, as a derivation of source code and not an entirely original creation, 
may be protected.313 The third is that major technological leaders like the United 
States, in decisions such as Data Cash v. ]S&A Group,314 have considered object 
code copyrightable. 315 
3. Court Decisions Addressing Software Copyrightability 
Unlike the United States, no definitive court decisions addressing the copy-
rightability of computer programs exist in Japan. Two Japanese district courts, 
however, have issued injunctive orders to prevent defendant manufacturers 
from producing and selling alleged copies of plaintitl's video games. 316 
The first decision granted a preliminary injunction on the ground that the 
programs used were copies of plaintiff's original programs.317 In the second, 
Nameo Inc. v. Nishi Nihon Sales Co., the plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction 
for infringement of a video game. 31B The court found that the defendant's game 
produced the same images and sounds as plaintitl's,319 and therefore granted 
the injunction.320 Although these preliminary injunctions cannot be considered 
definitive judicial statements on the copyrightability of computer programs, they 
provide the first affirmative indication under Japanese law that such protection 
is available. 321 
4. Copyright Protection of Video Games 
Current Japanese law provides three approaches for protecting video games 
under the copyright law. 322 The first relies on the definition of a computer 
310. Takaishi, supra note 2, at 132 n.15. 
311. [d. 
312. See supra text accompanying note 272. 
313. Takaishi, supra note 2, at 132 n.15. 
314. See supra discussion of Data Cash at text accompanying notes 117-21. 
315. Takaishi,supra note 2, at 132 n.15. The report cites Data Cash Systems v. ]S&A Group, 628 F.2d 
1038 (7th Cir. 1980) as an example of a foreign case holding object code copyrightable. Takaishi, supra 
note 2, at 132 n.15. 
316. Takaishi, supra note 2, at 132. 
317. [d. at 132-33, citing Sega Enterprises v. Taito Shoji in Nikkei Sangyo Newspaper (Nov. 16, 1981). 
Takaishi, supra note 2, at 133 n.16. 
318. See Doi, The Scope of Copyright Protection against Unauthorized Copying - Japan's Experience and 
Problems, 29 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 367, 377 n.16 (1982), citing 27 KOGYOSHOYUKENHO KENKYU 17 (1981). 
319. Doi, supra note 318, at 377. 
320. /d. 
321. Takaishi, supra note 2, at 133. 
322. Doi, supra note 318, at 377-78. 
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program as a work of authorship.323 Under a broad definition of reproduc-
tion,324 when a software developer authors a program and then embodies it in a 
ROM, this embodiment may be considered a reproduction of the original pro-
gram.325 Thus, when a competitor copies the developer's ROM into another 
ROM, the competitor is reproducing a work of authorship without permis-
sion.326 This approach to the protection of video game software in ROM form is 
very similar to the approach taken under U.s. law in such cases as Tandy and 
Williams. 327 In both of these cases the court found that the underlying ROM-
based software had been copyrighted, either directly as in Tandy, or indirectly by 
a copyright on the source code, as in Williams. Once the defendant copied the 
software, the defendant infringed plaintiff's copyright. 
The second approach under Japanese law regards video games as cinemato-
graphic works.328 When a video game is in the play mode, it displays a series of 
moving images on the picture tube. A computer program produces these pre-
fixed images. While playing the game, the player sim ply selects one of the limited 
number of prefixed copyrighted images. A competitor copying the program, 
then, will be copying the images, which constitutes an infringement.329 Under 
Japanese law, this second approach most closely mirrors the current U.s. view 
with respect to video games. In the most elementary handling of a video game 
suit, a U.S. court may look only to the visual images created by the plaintiff and 
displayed on a screen to see if these images are so nearly matched to defendant's 
as to constitute a copy. Such has been the outcome in several recent U.S. cases.330 
The third Japanese approach protects the small amount of electronic music 
which can be heard when a game is played. Unauthorized copying of a ROM 
containing a musical computer program is an infringement of the program 
author's reproductive right.331 Although presumably this third tack to copyright 
323. /d. Article 2(1) of the Copyright Law defines work of authorship as productions in which 
thoughts or sentiments are expressed in a creative way. See supra text accompanying note 268. Article 
10(1) lists the types of works of authorship. See supra text accompanying note 269. It may be concluded, 
given these two articles, that a computer program is a work of authorship. Doi, supra note 318, at 
377-78. 
324. COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 266, art. 21. 
325. See supra note 276 and accompanying text. 
326. Doi, supra note 318, at 378. 
327. See supra text accompanying notes 138-48 and 155-62. 
328. Doi, supra note 318, at 378. See also CoPYRIGHT LAw, supra note 266, art. 25. Cinematographic 
works are protected under Article 10. Article 26 gives the author of such a work the exclusive right to 
present his work publicly and to distribute it. The author of a work reproduced in cinematographic 
form retains similar rights. CoPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 266, arts. 10, 26. 
329. Doi, supra note 318, at 378. Compare with video game discussion supra in § II.C.2a. 
330. See, e.g., those cases cited supra at note 129. 
331. Doi, supra note 318, at 378. 
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protection of an underlying software program is possible under U.S. copyright 
laws,332 no case has yet been decided solely on these grounds.333 
5. Possible Bars to Software Copyright Protection 
Under Japanese copyright law as it is currently interpreted, two bars exist to 
the implementation of copyright protection for software.334 The first involves 
the execution of any program within a particular computer. In order to execute 
a software program, the program itself must regularly be copied from one 
section of memory to another as it is needed by different parts of the computer 
performing various data processing tasks. Under current Japanese law, such 
copying is not considered a reproduction, but rather an application, and there-
fore not protected by the copyright provisions.335 The second bar goes to the 
exclusive right to distribute computer programs. Under the current copyright 
law, no right exists which would impose limitations on the time, place, and 
purpose of the disposal of copyrighted software.336 
Japanese law in this area is at odds with U.S. law, under which both execution 
and distribution rights are specifically protected. A strict reading of amended 
section 117(1)337 of the U.S. copyright law gives copyright owners unlimited 
rights for program execution, and section 106(3)338 gives unlimited distribution 
rights. Thus, the execution of a computer program by a computer as well as the 
distribution of that program to the public, which may cause legal difficulties 
under Japanese copyright law, present no problems under U.S. copyright laws. 
6. Summary of Japanese Copyright Protection for Software 
Although no affirmative legislation or judicial opinion speaks to the copy-
rightability of software in Japan, a growing trend would allow computer pro-
grams to be copyrighted. This trend closely parallels the state of the law in the 
United States with regard to copyright protection of software. However, the 
Japanese laws are not as flexible as the U.S. laws with regard to the execution and 
distribution of programs. These are matters which may well have to be taken up 
in the Japanese courts or legislature. In the meantime, a software developer may 
332. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982) provides protection for musical works. 
333. In several cases, the U.S. coutts have referred to the sounds accompanying the visual images 
and have remarked that these sounds were or were not similar to the video game at dispute. See, e.g., 
Atari v. North American Phillips Consumer Electronics, 214 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 33, 37 (7th Cir. 1982); 
Stern Electronics v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 854 (2d Cir. 1982); and Midway Manufacturing v. 
Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 473 (D. Neb. 1981). 
334. See Takaishi, supra note 2, at 135-37. 
335. Nomura, supra note 290, at 134. 
336. Id. 
337. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982). For text of § 117, see supra note 108. 
338. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). 
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consider protecting his program under the Japanese patent laws, although this 
protection, as under u.s. law, is not extensive. 
B. Japanese Patent Law 
Under the Japanese Patent Law,339 Article 2 defines an invention as any "high 
grade creation among creations of technical ideas, utilizing natural rules."34o For 
a computer program to be patentable, it must not only incorporate a technolog-
ical thought using the laws of nature,341 but it must also be an invention that can 
be used in industry.342 The program must be novel and progressive,343 and no 
one else may have made another patent application for the same program.344 At 
present, Japanese legal theorists do not generally view computer programs as 
patentable, but instead as being totally artificial and lacking any basis in natural 
law. 345 
In 1976, the Japanese Patent Office issued the criteria it will use in examining 
computer program inventions.346 Although the criteria do not completely elimi-
nate patentability for computer programs, they do not recognize patentability 
339. Law No. 121, 1959 translated in 2 D. J. SINNOT, WORLD PATENT LAW & PRACTICE, JAPAN 2 
(1979) [hereinafter cited as PATENT LAw). 
[d. 
340. [d. an. 2. The full text of Article 2 provides: 
1. "Invention" in this Law shall mean any high grade creation among creations of technical 
ideas utilizing natural rules. 
2. "Patented invention" in this Law shall mean any invention on which a patent has been 
granted. 
3. "Working" in respect of an il}vention in this Law shall mean the followings acts: 
(I) In an invention of a thing, acts of manufacturing, using, transferring, leasing, exhibiting, 
for the purpose of transfer or lease, or imponing the thing; 
(2) In an invention of a process, acts of using the process; 
(3) In an invention of a process of manufacturing a thing, acts of using, transferring, leasing, 
exhibiting for the purpose of transfer or lease, or importing the thing by the process in 
addition to those as mentioned in the preceding items. 
341. /d. 
342. [d. art. 29(1). Article 29(1) states: 
Any person who has made an invention which can be utilized in industry may obtain a patent 
except for the following inventions: (I) an invention which has been publicly known in Japan 
prior to the patent application; (2) an invention which has been publicly worked in Japan prior 
to the patient application; (3) an invention which had been described in a publication distrib-
uted in Japan or in any foreign country prior to a patent application. 
[d. See generally Takaishi, supra note 2, at 137. 
[d. 
343. PATENT LAW, supra note 339, an. 29(2). Article 29(2) states: 
In the case where a person having an ordinary knowledge in the technical field to which such 
invention belongs could have made an invention easily on the basis of the invention as 
mentioned in each item of the preceding paragraph prior to the patent application, a patent 
may not, in spite of the provision of said paragraph, be granted in respect of such inventions. 
344. [d. art. 29(1). 
345. R. RUSSELL, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS in JAPAN 161 (1974). But see recent developments in the 
Japanese legislature with regard to the patentability of software cited supra note 265. 
346. Takaishi, supra note 2, at 137. 
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for a mere mathematical formula. 347 The viewpoint of the Japanese Patent 
Office closely follows the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Gottschalk v. Benson 34S 
and Parker v. Flook. 349 In each of these cases, the Court held that a computer 
program which could be found to be only a mathematical formula or algorithm 
was not patentable. Largely predicated on the principle that U.S. patents cannot 
be obtained for ideas/50 these decisions are reflected in the approach taken by 
Japan.351 
When viewed in this context, Articles 2352 and 29353 of the Japanese Patent 
Law provide very similar protection to that provided by sections 10 1,354 102,355 
and 103356 of the U.S. patent laws. Thus, as under U.S. law after the Diehr 
decision,357 a computer program used as part of a process control system358 may 
also qualify as patentable subject matter under Japanese law.359 That is, if a 
method of controlling, processing, manufacturing, or measuring uses a com-
puter and its program and is novel or creative enough to meet the standards set 
out in Article 29,360 that method may be patentable.361 
The 1972 MITI Report,362 however, observed that even if computer programs 
are considered patentable, the present patent system cannot provide adequate 
protection for three reasons. 363 First, because of the difficulty in meeting the 
novelty and progressiveness requirements, only a limited number of programs 
can meet the requirements of patentability under the existing patent law.364 
Second, the tremendous amount of prior art existing in the field of computer 
347. ld. 
348. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text. 
349. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text. 
350. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
351. Examples of unpatentable claims include a method for calculating by division, for classifying 
data, for automatically measuring a dynamic friction coefficient, and for calculating optimal profits 
from a process. Yamamoto & Conlin, Guidelines of tM japanese Patent Office for tM Examination of an 
Invention Related to a Computer Program, 77 PAT. & TRADEMARK REv. 195,203-13 (1979). Other examples 
of unpatentable programs include standard commercial application programs. Takaishi,supra note 2, at 
137. 
352. See supra note 341 and accompanying text. 
353. See supra notes 342, 343 and accompanying text. 
354. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
355. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
356. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
357. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); see supra text accompanying notes 60-65. 
358. Process control is the automatic monitoring and regulation of continuous operations such as oil 
refining, food processing, and steel manufacturing. 
359. Takaishi, supra note 2, at 137. 
360. For the text of Article 29, see supra note 340. 
361. R. RUSSELL, supra note 345, at 161. Patentable inventions or processes under Japanese law 
include a method for monitoring the process of a computer, and for automatic thickness control in a hot 
strip mill. Yamamoto & Conlin, supra note 351, at 213-19. 
362. See supra note 290 and accompanying text. 
363. T. DOl, supra note 267, at 12. 
364. ld. Compare with U.S. conditions discussed supra at text accompanying notes 70-75. 
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science would render the present examination system inadequate365 because it 
would be impossible to check on all of the previously developed computer 
programs. Third, the life of computer programs is generally much shorter than 
for ordinary technology. 366 By the time a patent is obtained, the program is often 
obsolete. 
1. Protection of U.S. Patents in Japan 
The Japanese patent laws protect only those inventions registered in Japan. 367 
They are laws of territorial application and do not apply to acts committed 
abroad.36s Thus, a plaintiff could not bring a suit based on Japanese law in a 
Japanese court for patent infringement which occurred outside of Japanese 
jurisdiction. Article 11 of the Horei (the law concerning the application oflaws)369 
is applicable to tortious acts, including patent infringement, and further qualifies 
this jurisdictional requirement.37o Article 11(2) of the Horei specifies that where 
an act occurring in a foreign country is not unlawful under the laws of Japan, 
such an act does not give rise to a tort claim in Japanese courts.371 Therefore, to 
prevent unlicensed manufacture in Japan of an article patented in the United 
States, a U.S. business should also obtain a Japanese patent. 372 
Under Japanese case law, the only decision to construe Article 11(2) of the 
Horei is Nihon Musentsuhin K.K. v. Masushita Denki K.K.373 In that case, the 
plaintiff, an owner of both Japanese and Manchurian patents on a radio tube, 
brought an action for damages in a Japanese court claiming infringement of its 
Manchurian patents. The defendant manufactured radio receiving sets in Japan 
and shipped them to Manchuria. These radio receiving sets contained radio 
tubes manufactured by the plaintiff's licensee under plaintiff's patent. The court 
dismissed the action under Article 11(2) of the Horei on the ground that given 
the principle of the independence of patents, "only Japanese patents are recog-
nized in Japan and foreign patents have no protectable rights in Japan, hence an 
act which infringes upon a patent of a foreign country does not constitute a tort. 
This is true of a Manchurian patent."374 
365. T. 001, supra note 267, at 12. 
366. Id. 
367. PRICE WATERHOUSE CO., DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN: INFORMATION GUIDE 14 (1975). 
368. PINNER, supra note 267, § I. 
369. Law No. 10, 1898 [hereinafter cited as Horeij, translated in PINNER, supra note 267, § I. 
370. PINNER, supra note 267, §§ Survey, I. 
371. Horei, art. 11(2), supra note 369, translated in PINNER, supra note 267, § I. 
372. PRICE WATERHOUSE CO., supra note 367, at 14. The U.S. manufacturer, however, should be 
careful to comply with the timing of the registration vis-a-vis publication in the United States as specified 
under Japan's patent law, Law No. 121, 1959, art. 29(1). For text of Article 29(1), see supra note 342. 
373. PINNER, supra note 267, § I. 
374. Id. 
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2. Summary of Japanese Patent Law 
A U.S. manufacturer who desires patent protection in Japan should take steps 
to register its software under Japanese law at the same time registration occurs 
for U.S. patents. Japanese patent law may afford the software some protection, 
so long as the computer program is part of a manufacturing, controlling, 
measuring, or some other type of process. Like U.S. law, Japanese patent law 
does not extend protection to pure mathematical formulae or algorithms. 
Patent protection under Japanese law is not adequate for most programs. 
However, if a software proprietor cannot invoke either copyright protection or 
patent protection under Japanese law, other safeguards exist which may help to 
protect the software. These protections fall generally under tort principles, 
although they are not trade secret protections. Nor are they protections that can 
be relied upon with the same assurance that trade secret law provides software 
developers in the United States. 
C. Other Protections under Japanese Law 
1. Trade Secret Law 
In Japan, trade secret law has not sufficiently developed to protect software.375 
No statutory provision clearly mentions trade secrets.376 For example, the 
Japanese Unfair Competition Prevention Law377 does not prohibit misappropri-
ation of trade secrets or industrial espionage. 378 Article 1 (1) prohibits only those 
acts which would cause confusion with goods of another person by using an 
identical or similar name, trademark, container, or wrapping. 379 Article 1(2) 
prohibits acts which would create confusion between two business activities or 
facilities in similar circumstances to those enumerated in Article 1(1).380 The last 
four sections of Article 1( 1) deal with misleading the public as to the origin of 
goods, their quality, contents, or quantity, and the slander of a competitor's 
goods.381 
A plaintiff may seek civil remedies against unauthorized disclosure or misap-
375. Takaishi, supra note 2, at 138. 
376. Id. 
377. Fusei-kyoso-boshi-ho, Law No. 14, 1934, as amended in 1938, 1950, 1953, and 1965 [hereinaf-
ter cited as UNFAIR COMPETITION LAwl, translated in PINNER, supra note 267, § Survey. 
378. PINNER, supra note 67, § 1. 
379. UNFAIR COMPETITION Law,supra note 377, art. 1(1), translated in 1 A. WISE, TRADE SECRETS AND 
KNOW-How THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 1.76 (1981) and in 3 S. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND 
RELATED RIGHTS 1704 (1975). 
380. UNFAIR CoMPETITION LAw, supra note 377, art. 1(2), translated in 1 A. WISE, supra note 379, at 1.76 
and in 3 S. LADAS, supra note 379, at 1704. 
381. UNFAIR COMPETITION LAw,supra note 377, art. 1(3), (4),translatedin 1 A. WISE, supra note 379, at 
1.76 and in 3 S. LADAS, supra note 379, at 1704. 
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propnauon of trade secrets under the general tort provlSlons of the Civil 
Code. 3M2 The Civil Code3M3 recognizes intangible property or de facto property 
rights3H4 similar to that of goodwill. 3sS According to Articles 7033S6 and 7043S7 of 
the Civil Code, a plaintiff may resort to a theory of unjust enrichment.3sH 
Plaintiffs may also use a tort concept involving infringement of rights under 
Article 709 of the Code.3s9 Article 709 provides that "a person who, willfully or 
negligently, has injured the right of another is bound to compensate him for the 
damage which has arisen therefrom."39o It is uncertain whether this avenue is 
available to the owner of trade secrets who seeks damages for the misappropria-
tion or unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets by another, because Article 709 
does not expressly state that a trade secret is a protect able right.391 However, if 
the injured owner of the trade secret can prove that a right exists that should be 
protected by the law, and this right was injured,392 the plaintiff may collect 
damages, even if Article 709 is interpreted strictly.393 Moreover, a liberal in-
terpretation of this section provides that if the injured party can prove that an 
inviolable interest exists, and the defendant injured this interest by an illegal act, 
the injured party can recover. 394 
Article 709 contains no mention of injunctive relief, although Article 198 of 
the Civil Code provides that "if a possessor is disturbed in his possession, he may 
bring an action for the maintenance of possession, demand discontinuance of 
the disturbance, as well as reparation of damages."395 However, the Civil Code 
382. T. DOl, supra note 267, at 87. 
383. MINPO, Law No. 89, as amended by Law No. 51, May 17, 1980, reprinted in English in 2 
EIBUN-HoREI-SHA (EHS) L. BULL. SERIES, at FA 1 (1981) [herein~fter cited as CIVIL CODE]. 
384. 3 S. LADAS, supra note 379, at 1630. 
385. 1 A. WISE, supra note 379, at 1.65. 
386. CIVIL CODE, supra note 383, art. 703, at FA 115. Article 703 provides: "a person, who without 
any legal ground derives a benefit from the property or services of another and thereby causes loss to 
the latter, is bound to return such benefit to the extent that it still exists." Id. 
387. Id. art. 704, at FA 115. Articl~ 704 states: "a person enriched mala fide shall return the benefit 
received by him with interest, and if there has been any damage, he is bound also to make compensation 
therefor." Id. 
388. 3 S. LADAS, supra note 379, at 1630. 
389. Id.; see also 1 A. WISE, supra note 379, at 1.65. 
390. OVIL CoDE, supra note 383, art. 709 at FA 116. See also T. DOl, supra note 267, at 87 and PINNER, 
supra note 267, § 74. 
391. PINNER, supra note 267, § 74. 
392. 1 A. WISE, supra note 379, at 1.62-1.63, citing the Japanese Supreme Court case of Daija Kuyu in 4 
Dai Shin-In Minji Hanrei Shu 670 [A Collection of the Great Court of Judicature Civil Cases], 5 Hanrei 
Minji Ho 524 [Civil Case Law] (note Suehire) (Great Court of Judicature, Civil Dep't III, Nov. 28, 1925). 
The Court defines a right as "an interest which warrants protection by the law even though such an 
interest cannot be called a 'right' " in the same manner as ownership or surface rights, claimable assets, 
intangible property rights, or rights of honor. Id. 
393. T. DOl, supra note 267, at 87; see also PINNER, supra note 267, § 74. 
394. T. Doi, supra note 267, at 87; see also PINNER, supra note 267, § 74. 
395. CIVIL CODE,supra note 383, art. 198, at FA 34. See also T. DOI,supra note 267, at 87-88; PINNER, 
supra note 267, § 74. 
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does not provide for injunctive relief when trade secrets are misappropriated.396 
The only Japanese court decision in this area clearly demonstrates this interpre-
tation.397 In that case, plaintiff signed an agreement with another company 
granting an exclusive license to manufacture and sell oil-lubricated sealings in 
the United States and Canada. The other company agreed to keep the process a 
secret. However, in order to manufacture these sealings in Japan, plaintiff's 
licensee signed an agreement with a Japanese company, thereby forming the 
defendant company. Plaintiff claimed that defendant's act of manufacturing the 
sealings was in violation of the contract between plaintiff and its licensee and 
argued that it was entitled to injunctive relief from both companies. Although 
the Tokyo High Court admitted the property value of the trade secret, it denied 
the relief because defendant was a third party to the contract. The High Court 
stated that no provision existed to restrain such acts. 39H 
Such an outcome in a similar situation would be unthinkable in the United 
States.399 Trade secret law in the United States is based primarily on unfair 
competition law, but also has roots in property, contract, quasi-contract, and 
breach of confidence concepts.400 Many of these notions are tied to contractual 
licensing agreements that are popular among trade secret proprietors, especially 
software developers, in the United States.401 Therefore, suits brought in the 
United States for misappropriation of trade secrets involve more than unfair 
business allegations, but also depend heavily on well established concepts of 
property and contract rights. 
2. License Agreements 
As in the United States, contractual protection of software through licensing is 
of primary im.portance in Japan.402 Software developers may issue licenses for 
copyrighted or patented software, but the most important licenses are those for 
the purpose of trade secret protection. As in the United States, such licenses 
usually contain a closely worded confidentiality clause.403 The general princi-
ples of the law of obligations and contract contained in the Civil Code404 govern 
licensing agreements of trade secrets in Japan.405 Any such licensing agreement 
396. PINNER, supra note 267, § 74. 
397. Deutsche Werft Aktiengesellschaft v. Cheutsu-Waukesha Yugen Kaisha, 17 Kakyu minshu 769 
(Tokyo High Court, Sept. 5, 1966), cited in T. Om, supra note 267, at 88, 99 n.9; see also PINNER, supra 
note 267, § 74; Takaishi, supra note 2, at 138. 
398. T. Om, supra note 267, at 88-90. 
399. See, e.g., discussion supra of University Computing v. Lykes Youngstown at text accompanying 
notes 207-08. 
400. Bender, supra note 31, at 5. 
401. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 191. 
402. Takaishi, supra note 2, at 138. 
403. Id. at 139. 
404. CIVIL CODE, supra note 383, art. XX at FA XX. 
405. 1 A. WISE, supra note 379, at 1.131. 
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must be in writing.406 Furthermore, all agreements with Japanese licensees 
relating to industrial rights are subject to government approval. 407 Those 
agreements whose duration is for longer than one year must have the approval 
of the Ministry of Finance, whereas those of less than one year require MITl's 
approval.40~ Government approval, it is believed, will help to eliminate those 
licenses which could be detrimental to the Japanese economy.409 License agree-
ments are the most effective means for maintaining trade secrecy for foreign 
manufacturers doing business in Japan. 410 
In sum, Japanese law provides no explicit protection for trade secrets as does 
U.S. law. Thus, for the U.S. software developer who has protected an investment 
through carefully controlled secrets and agreements in the United States, the 
Japanese marketplace may present unusual hazards. A software proprietor may 
obtain some protection through licensing agreements. However, trade secret law 
in Japan must be considered in its infancy and of little value in protecting 
software rights. 
D. Protections for Software under Japanese Law: Conclusion 
The most reliable method of software protection in Japan is that provided 
under copyright law. However, these safeguards are less than those provided 
under U.S. law. Yet Japan is following the United States in incorporating innova-
tive protections within its statutory constructions, and those familiar with the 
U.S. copyright law will see striking similarities between the two countries' copy-
right protections for software. Processes employing computer programs can be 
protected under Japanese patent law. As in the United States, however, there 
will be few programs in Japan that will meet statutory qualifications. Finally, 
trade secret law, an area that is and has been so important for software develop-
ment in the United States, is virtually nonexistent in Japan. This one area 
perhaps best illustrates the broad dividing line between the protections afforded 
developments in each of these technically advanced countries. Such a division 
also illustrates the need for more thorough and uniform software protections on 
an international level. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 
Presently, software developers in the United States and Japan may seek pro-
tection under two international agreements. The first, the Berne Convention for 
406. ld. 
407. 3 L. ECKSTROM, LiCENSING IN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC OPERATIONS § 31-08, at 31-117 (1974). 
408. ld. at 31-117 to 31-118. See supra note 298 for a description of MIT!,s overall functions. 
409. 3 L. ECKSTROM, supra note 407, at 31-121. 
410. See supra text accompanying notes 397-98. 
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the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,411 has been signed by Japan.412 
The second, the Universal Copyright Convention (U.C.C.),413 has been signed by 
both the United States and Japan. 414 A third set of protections proposed by the 
International Bureau of the World Property Organization in its Model Provi-
sions415 would provide protections specifically aimed at computer programs. 
Under Japanese law, the rights afforded authors of either a Berne or U.C.C. 
signatory country will be the same as those afforded Japanese authors under 
Japanese laws, unless the treaty provides otherwise. 416 Under U.S. law, works 
that are published in a country party to the U .e.C. receive the same treatment as 
though they had been published in the United States.417 Although both conven-
tions provide similar copyright protections for authors,41~ the Berne Convention 
goes further in protecting an author's moral rights. 419 Because of these addi-
tional rights, some authors may seek "back door" protection under Berne's 
provisions,420 even though their own country is not a member of the Convention. 
Despite the fact that the United States is not a member of the Berne Conven-
tion, an understanding of its provisions and how they may affect the protection 
of software is helpful for two reasons. The first is the importance the Berne 
Convention plays in the international copyright scheme, and the second is the 
back door policy by which many U.S. software developers may be protected 
under the Berne Convention's provisions. The following discussion will give a 
broad view of the Convention and the protections it provides. It will then focus 
on the back door policy. Lastly, it will look at those continuing barriers prevent-
ing the United States from becoming a signatory. 
411. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, as revised at Paris, July 24, 
1971, U.N. Reg. No. 18,338 (not yet published) [hereinafter cited as Berne], reprinted in COPYRIGHT L. 
REP. (CCH) ~ 11,440-79 (1978). 
412. Ableman & Berkowitz,lnternational Copyright Law, 22 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 619, 649 (1977). This 
article lists all Berne adherents. 
413. Universal Copyright Convention, as revised at Paris, July 24, 1971 [hereinafter cited as U.e.C.], 
25 U.S.T. 1341, T.l.A.S. No. 7868. 
414. Ableman & Berkowitz, supra note 408, at 649, 651. This article lists all the Universal Copyright 
Convention adherents. 
415. See generally Model Provisions, supra note 2. 
416. COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 266, arts. 5, 6(iii). 
417. 17 U.S.C. § 104(b)(2) (1982). 
418. See infra text accompanying notes 425, 449-50. 
419. See infra notes 440-42 and accompanying text. 
420. See infra text accompanying notes 429-33. 
421. The Berne Convention was formalized in 1886 and has been revised five times since then: in 
Berlin (1908), in Rome (1928), in Brussels (1948), in Stockholm (1967) and, most recently, in Paris 
(1971). COPYRIGHT L. REp. (CCH) ~ 6025. See de Sanctis, The International Copyright Conventions, 14 
COPYRIGHT, 254, 254-56 (1978) tor a detailed history of the various Berne enactments. 
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A. The Berne Convention 
The Berne Convention421 provides international protection for works of au-
thorship.422 Under the Convention, an author obtaining a copyright in a Berne 
signatory country has the same protection in other signatory countries as an 
author in the nation whose protection is sought. 423 Thus, foreign authors ex-
perience no discrimination. 
Article lI(l) of the Berne Convention states that literary and artistic works 
include "every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever 
may be the mode or form of its expression."424 Article 11(2) limits this definition 
by stating that signatory countries may prescribe by legislation that any works in 
general or any specified category of works shall not be protected unless they have 
been fixed in some material form.425 Thus, although the Berne Convention may 
protect software generally, the standard of protection will vary according to the 
laws of the country in which the protection is sought. 426 No copyright protection 
will be available in a Berne country which does not recognize computer pro-
grams as suitable subject matter.427 
Despite the fact that the United States is not a signatory country, U.S. authors 
may nevertheless avail themselves of the protections afforded by the Berne 
Convention. Article VI( 1) of the Convention42~ provides protection in the case of 
422. COPYRIGHT L. REp. (CCH) 11 6025. Article 3 supplies these protections and states: 
(1) The protection of this Convention shall apply to: (a) authors who are nationals of one of 
the countries of the Union, for their works, whether published or not; (b) authors who are not 
nationals of one of the countries of the Union, for their works first published in one of those 
countries, or simultaneously in a country outside the Union and in a country of the Union. 
(2) Authors who are nationals of one of the countries in the Union but who have their 
habitual residence in one of them shall, for the purposes of this Convention, be assimilated to 
nationals of that country. 
(3) The expression "published works" means works published with the consent of their 
authors, whatever may be the means of manufacture of the copies, provided that the availabil-
ity of such copies has been such as to satisfy the reasonable requirements of the public, having 
regard to the nature of the work. The performance of a dramatic, dramatic-musical, 
cinematographic or musical work, the public recitation of a literary work, the communication 
by wire or the broadcasting of literary or artistic works, the exhibition of a work of art and the 
construction of a work of architecture shall not constitute publication. 
(4) A work shall be considered as having been published simultaneously in several countries 
if it has been published in two or more countries within thirty days of its first publication. 
Berne, art. 3. reIJrinted in COPYRIGHT L. REp. (CCH) II 11,405. 
423. COPYRIGHT L. REp. (CCH) 11 6025. 
424. Berne, reprinted in COPYRIGHT L. REp. (CCH) 11 11,402. 
425. Id. 
426. Salzman,lnternational Protection for Computer Software, 12 L. & COMPUTER TECH. 3,4 (1979). 
427. Id. 
428. Article 6(1) states: 
Where any country outside the Union fails to protect in an adequate manner the works of 
authors who are nationals of one of the countries of the Union, the latter country may restrict 
the protection given to the works of authors who are, at the date of the first publication 
thereof, nationals of the other country and are not habitually resident in one of the countries 
of the Union shall not be required to grant to works thus subjected to special treatment a wider 
protection than that granted to them in the country of first publication. 
Berne, art 6(1), reprinted in COPYRIGHT L. REp. (CCH) 11 11,407. 
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simultaneous publication in a Berne nation by nationals of nonmember states.429 
Traditionally, U.S. authors have used this "back door to Berne" by simultaneous 
publication in the United States and Canada, thereby obtaining the benefits of 
the Convention without subjecting the United States to obligations under it. 430 
Thus, a U.S. software proprietor may seek protection for computer programs 
under the Berne Convention by publication under Canadian or another Berne 
signatory's laws. If the developer were seeking protection in Japan under the 
Berne Convention, Japanese copyright law would govern.431 However, a 
Japanese developer could not likewise invoke Berne protections under U.S. law 
as the United States is not a signatory.432 
If the United States were a signatory to Berne, efforts to get in the back door 
would be unnecessary. However, four barriers have prevented the United States 
from becoming a Berne Convention member. 433 The passage of the 1976 Copy-
right Act lowered two of these barriers: the duration of the copyright434 and a 
requirement of U.S. manufacture. 435 The adoption of a life plus fifty year 
term436 now puts the U.S. copyright law into conformity with Article VII of the 
Berne Convention.437 With respect to the latter barrier, before passage of the 
1976 Act, the federal government would only grant copyright protection to 
English language works manufactured in the United States. 438 The 1976 Act 
liberalized this manufacturing clause, but did not eliminate it.439 
The final two barriers preventing U.S. copyright law conformity with the 
provisions of the Berne Convention will be more difficult to remove. The third 
barrier concerns the issue of moral rights under copyright law. 440 U.S. copyright 
law does not accept, per se, the doctrine of moral right. Although certain court 
decisions441 imply rights that seem to be moral rights, none of these rights fully 
429. COPYRIGHT L. REp. (CCH) If 6050. 
430. Note, The Question of Berne Entryfor the United States, 11 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 421,422-23 n.1 0 
(1979). 
431. Takaishi, supra note 2, at 140. 
432. [d. 
433. Note, supra note 430, at 426-28. 
434. [d. at 426. 
435. [d. at 427. 
436. 17 V.S.C. § 302(a) (1982). 
437. Article 7(1) of the Berne Convention states that "the term of protection granted by this 
convention shall be the life of the author and fifty years after his death." Berne, art. 7( 1) reprinted in 
COPYRIGHT L. REp. (CCH) If 11,409. 
438. Note, supra note 430, at 427. 
439. 17 V.S.C. § 60 I (1982). 
440. Moral rights of an author include the right to modify and to prevent deformation; the right to 
prevent excess criticism; the right to prohibit other attacks on the personality of the creator; the right to 
create and to publish, or note, in any form desired; the right to be made known to the public as the 
creator of his work; the right to prevent others from usurping his work by naming another person as 
author; and the right to prevent others from wrongfully attributing to him a work he has not written 
(these last three are sometimes referred to as the paternity right). Note, supra note 430, at 429, 431. 
441. See, e.g., Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, 538 F.2d 14,24-25 (2d Cir. 1976); Granz 
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complies with Article VI bis(l) of the Berne Convention. 442 The fourth and last 
barrier centers on the U.S. requirement of notice which mandates that the date 
of first publication, the name of the copyright owner, and the word or symbol for 
copyright be displayed on a visually perceptible copy of the work.443 Under the 
Berne Convention, the enjoyment and exercise of the rights given under the 
various signatory countries' laws are not to be subject to any formality such as the 
U.S. notice requirement. 444 As the United States has recently relaxed its notice 
requirement under the 1976 Act,445 little likelihood exists that it will soon 
dispense with all notice requirements. 446 
So long as the United States maintains its notice requirements and denies 
protection of authors' moral rights, it is unlikely that it will become a member of 
the Berne Convention. However, the United States is a member of tLe Universal 
Copyright Convention and, as such, other international protection is afforded 
U.S. software proprietors. Provided that a U.S. software developer does not wish 
to invoke moral rights in a software program, then the U.C.C. will provide 
certain copyright protections under Japanese law. 
B. The Universal Copyright Convention 
Believing that the United States was a necessary party to any international 
scheme of copyright protection, various nations promulgated the U.C.C. so that 
the Berne provisions, with which the United States did not agree, could be 
avoided.447 Designed and created as a convention distinct from any other inter-
national convention, the U .C.C. serves as a complement to the Berne Conven-
tion448 by deferring to any Berne provisions in countries where both conventions 
are in effect.449 The U.C.C. and Berne differ in several respects, although the 
principle of national treatment in each is the same.450 The differences under the 
v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 590 (2d Cir. 1952); Neland v. Home Pattern Co., 65 F.2d 363, 364 (7th Cir. 
1933); Curwood v. Affilated Distributors, 283 F. 219, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1922); Clemens v. Press Publish-
ing Co., 122 N.Y. Supp. 206,206·07 (1910). 
442. Article 6 bis(l) states: 
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, 
the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, 
mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, 
which would be prejudical to his honor or reputation. 
Berne, art. 6 bis( I), reprinted in CoPYRIGHT L. REp. (CCH) If 11,408. 
443. 17 V.S.C. § 401 (1982). 
444. Berne, art. 5(2), reprinted in COPYRIGHT L. REp. (CCH) If 11,406. 
445. See supra notes 100-0 I and accompanying text. 
446. Note, supra note 430, at 444. 
447. /d. at 423. 
448. De Sanctis, supra note 421, at 256. 
449. V.C.C., art. XVII(I), 25 V.S.T. 1367, T.I.A.S. No. 7868. 
450. Note, supra note 430, at 423-24; see also V.C.C., art. II, 25 V.S.T. 1345, T.I.A.S. No. 7868. 
451. V.C.C., art. IV, 25 V.S.T. 1347-49, T.I.A.S. No. 7868. 
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V.C.C. include a minimum copyright duration after the life of the author plus 
twenty-five years or as stated under the contracting State's laws (if a longer term 
is specified),451 a formality of copyright notice,452 and no provision for the 
protection of moral rights.453 
The V.C.C. provides for the protection of the rights of authors and other 
copyright proprietors in literary, scientific, and artistic works. 454 Article IV455 
defines "publication" so as to require general distribution to the public of copies 
of a work which can be read or otherwise visually perceived. This provision 
would eliminate magnetic tape, and possibly punch cards, containing computer 
programs from V.C.C. coverage.456 It would also eliminate any protection for 
software in the form of object code or firmware. Therefore, by its own terms, the 
V.C.c. provides only limited software protection. However, under the U.C.C., 
both U.S. and Japanese software developers protected at home would be af-
forded protection in each other's country to the extent of that country's laws. 
Under the national treatment provisions of Article II, the U.C.C. would supply a 
U.S. software developer with such protections as are afforded Japanese software 
developers.457 The converse is true for Japanese developers seeking protection 
in the United States. 
Given the fact that the United States is not a Berne signatory, and that the 
V.C.C. provides little protection for software developers beyond what is available 
under an individual signatory's laws, the need for international protection of 
software is obvious. To date, no such protection has emerged, but a very 
thorough scheme under the Model Provisions has been suggested. The following 
discussion provides an overview of the reasons behind the creation of the 
provisions as well as a summary of the protection they afford. 
C. The Model Provisions 
The International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WI PO) prepared the Model Provisions for the Protection of Computer Software 
to meet several needs.458 WIPO sought a means of protection that would serve as 
452. V.C.C., art. III, 25 V.S.T. 1345-46, T.I.A.S. No. 7868. 
453. Note, supra note 430, at 424. 
454. V.C.C., Preamble, 25 V.S.T. 1344, T.I.A.S. No. 7868. 
455. Article VI defines publication as the reproduction in tangible form and the general distribution 
to the public of copies of a work from which it can be read or otherwise visually perceived. V.C.C., art. 
VI, 25 V.S.T. 1362, T.I.A.S. No. 7868. 
456. Salzman, supra note 426, at 4. 
457. Article 1I(l) states: 
Published works of nationals of any Contracting State and works first published in that State 
shall enjoy in each other Contracting State the same protection as that other State accords to 
works of its nationals first published in its own territory, as well as the protection specially 
granted by this Convention. 
V.C.C., art. 11(1),25 V.S.T. 1345, T.I.A.S. 7868. 
458. See generally Model Provisions, supra note 2. 
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an incentive to disclosure and as a basis for trade. 459 It also sought, through its 
Model Provisions, a redress to the extreme vulnerability of computer software to 
copying. 460 
The Model Provisions make two major recommendations for instituting an 
international system of protection. The first recommendation is that any system 
be based on a copyright law approach.461 WIPO decided that copyright protec-
tion was appropriate for computer software since a large amount of computer 
software consists of descriptive or explanatory matter that can be considered a 
form of expression under copyright laws. 462 The second recommendation is that 
a mandatory system of deposit, or alternatively, a less rigorous registration 
system, be instituted to ensure the eventual disclosure of the software to the 
public. 463 The deposit would aid in the dissemination of the software, facilitate 
its sale or licensing, and increase the knowlege concerning what was actually 
being protected, i.e., source code or object code, audiovisual effects, or the actual 
program.464 
The Model Provisions go to the heart of removing difficulties which have 
arisen in implementing national systems of protection. Thus, the differences in 
protection under U.S. law between trade secret, patent, or copyright protection 
would be eliminated. So too would the similar insecurity under japan's laws. 
Furthermore, a single protective system would be available for the software 
proprietor doing business in both countries. 
The provisions would protect all computer software465 including computer 
programs,466 program descriptions,467 and supporting materials.468 Although 
Japanese and U.S. law protect the supporting materials in the form of documen-
tation and manuals,469 and the program descriptions in the form of flow charts 
or diagrams under copyright law,470 the computer programs themselves are not 
459. [d. at 4. 
460. [d. 
461. [d. at 7. 
462. [d. at 5. 
463. [d. at 7. 
464. [d. 
465. Section I(iv), Model PrIJVmons, supra note 2, at I I. 
466. Section I(i), Model PrIJVisions, supra note 2, at I I. Computer program is defined as "a set of 
instructions capable, when incorporated in a machine-readable medium, of causing a machine having 
information-processing capabilities to indicate, perform or achieve a particular function, task or result." 
[d. 
467. Section I(ii), Model PrIJVisions, supra note 2, at I I. Program description is defined as "a complete 
procedural presentation in verbal, schematic or other form, in sufficient detail to determine a set of 
instructions constituting a corresponding computer program." [d. 
468. Section I(iii), Model Provisions, supra note 2, at I I. Supporting materials include: "any material, 
other than a computer program or a program description, created for aiding the understanding or 
application of a computer program, for example problem descriptions and user instructions." Model 
Provisions, supra note 2, at II. 
469. See, e.g., supra discussion at text accompanying notes 270 and 116. 
470. See, e.g., supra discussion at text accompanying notes 269 and 97. 
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assured of the same protection.471 Nor can the programs necessarily be pro-
tected under another theory oflaw. Therefore, the WIPO provisions would fully 
guarantee software developers protection for their programs in whatever form 
under an international scheme. 
The rights granted under the provisions would adhere to the person who 
created the software, unless created under the auspices of an employer, in which 
case the rights would belong to the employer.472 The provisions further state 
that they will apply only to computer software which is original in the sense that 
it is the result of its creator's own intellectual effort473 and that the rights 
provided will not extend to the underlying concepts on which the software is 
based.474 The rights afforded under the provisions will last for twenty years. 475 
Finally, the rights afforded under the provisions include the right to prevent any 
person from disclosing the computer software, allowing access to the software 
before general access is permitted, using the program to produce the same or 
substantially similar program, utilizing the program to control the operation of a 
computer, or offering the computer program for sale, lease, or hire.476 
The provisions would subject software to uniform conditions of protection 
and would place greater emphasis on the dispersal of information to all in-
terested parties.477 Because of the added security, developers would be more 
likely to offer their software for sale or lease on an open market.478 The Model 
Provisions, although not mandating the deposit of software upon registration, 
suggest that such a system could lead to an advancement in the art similar to that 
obtained with a patent application.479 The provisions also suggest such a system 
would prevent duplication of effort among software developers.48o Because of 
the present secrecy surrounding most software development, major advances in 
the state of the art come slowly, while duplication of effort is widespread. 
It will be four to five years before an international treaty on the subject of 
the Model Provisions is submitted to a diplomatic conference.481 This delay 
should allow adequate time for industry observations to be made and for subse-
quent recommendatiohs to be incorporated into the provisions. 492 
471. See supra text accompanying notes 305-07 for a discussion of the Japanese view of object code 
vis-a.-vis source code. See supra text accompanying notes 155-80 for the U.S. view. 
472. Section 2, MOtUl Provisions, supra note 2, at 14-15. 
473. Section 3, MOtUl Provisions, supra note 2, at 16. 
474. Section 4, MOtUI Provisions, supra note 2, at 17. 
475. Section 7, MOtUl Provisions, supra note 2, at 21. 
476. Section 8, MOtUI Provisions, supra note 2, at 18. 
477. Kolle, Computer Software Protection -Present Situation and Future Prospects, 13 CoPYRIGHT 70,75 
(1977). 
478. MOtUl Provisions, supra note 2, at 7. 
479.Id. 
480. /d. 
481. Braubach, supra note 9, at 228. 
482. Id. 
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Most developing nations do not have a software protection system similar to 
those evolving in industrial nations such as Japan and the United States.483 The 
type of protections proposed under the WIPO provisions may aid in the dis-
semination of computer technology to less developed countries, without causing 
great expense to countries such as the United States and Japan. The WIPO 
provisions would also implement a common exchange of software technology for 
the United States and Japan, thereby potentially decreasing the amount of 
duplicated effort each country undertakes in the development of software. All 
software developers would benefit from a copyright scheme that affords ade-
quate protections and a registration system that adequately handles infringe-
ment detection. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Protections for software are steadily evolving in both the United States and 
Japan, although neither country possesses a complete plan of software 
safeguards. In each country, the most effective means of computer program 
protection is by copyright, although the United States provides by far the greater 
and more assured protection under this type of scheme. Meanwhile, Japan 
continues to scrutinize what is occurring in the U.S. courts and Congress with 
regard to software protections, before adopting similar safeguards herself. 
Patent protection in either country has been, and will continue to be, a difficult 
protection to obtain. Software must be an integral part of a process in order to 
meet the statutory subject matter requirement under both countries' laws, and 
this criterion will remain elusive for most developers. 
Trade secret protection will most likely remain a mainstay safeguard for many 
software proprietors in the United States. Coupled with individual licensing 
agreements, trade secret protection has provided a nurturing environment for 
the growing software industry until recently, and these old ways will die hard. 
But the wary U.S. businessman entering the Japanese market must rely on 
contractual relationships alone to protect a closely held interest; no common law 
trade secret protection exists under Japanese laws. 
These different approaches, offering varying levels of protection, may one 
day become obsolete should an international system of protection be instituted. 
At the present time, international treaties provide little added protection beyond 
what each individual country can offer. Should WIPO's Model Provisions ever be 
enacted on an international basis, software protection would be greatly in-
creased. Until such time, however, a working knowledge of both U.S. and 
Japanese protections as they now exist may help to increase the effectiveness of 
those safeguards in the United States, in Japan, and in a world marketplace. 
Pamela L. Hamilton 
483. See Salzman, supra note 426, at 14-18. 
